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INTRODUCTION
We lack a well-developed positive theory of environmental law. A positive
environmental law theory, as opposed to a normative theory, explains environmental
law rather than focus on rationales for reform.1 A positive theory focuses on what
the law is, not what it should be. 2 Although a positive theory constitutes a
description, some of this theory describes normative commitments underlying the
choices found in environmental law. A positive theory need not endorse all aspects
of existing environmental law. Positivism is not cheerleading. But to the extent a
positive theory explains the reasons for existing law, it provides the basis for a wellinformed debate about which reforms would improve it and which would make it
worse. And a conceptual framework aids environmental advocacy, which often
depends as much upon explaining policy considerations as upon specific details.3
Such a theory not only aids policy and legal debates, it can also improve
teaching. Environmental law teaching usually focuses on the mastery of detail. The
traditional environmental law course covers several complex and often lengthy
environmental statutes. 4 Although nobody disputes the need to teach mastery of
1

Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (defining positive political theory as “non-normative”
because it explains political events rather than evaluate their desirability). See generally
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7–20 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967)
(1960) (describing positive law as “objectively valid norm[s]” and stating that this
interpretation is possible only under the condition that a basic norm is “presupposed”).
2
See Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 387, 387–390 (2008) (describing positive and normative legal theory as seemingly
“radically disjunct” because normative theory focuses on value and desirability while
positive theory focuses on facts about the law from an internal perspective); James Paul
Maniscalco, Note, The New Positivism: An Analysis of the Role of Morality in Jurisprudence,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (describing legal theory’s “separation of law as it is from
law as it ought to be”).
3
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that EPA must
consider cost in deciding whether regulation of mercury from power plants is “necessary and
appropriate” based largely on philosophy supporting cost-benefit balancing).
4
See, e.g., ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 5–15 (3d ed. 2012) (introducing sources of federal environmental law, including
numerous environmental statutes); DANIEL A. FARBER & ANN E. CARLSON, CASES AND
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detail to future environmental lawyers, a conceptual framework can give meaning
to details. Such a complex field cries out for a positive theoretical foundation.
Yet, normative scholarship, meaning scholarship aimed at improving rather
than describing the law, dominates environmental legal theory. And a lot of this
takes the form of outsider scholarship with a normative orientation in some tension
with the field’s traditional core commitments. For example, in recent years
prominent scholars have argued that rational environmental policy requires costbenefit analysis (CBA).5 CBA has gained a place in the corpus of environmental
law, but the normative foundations most commonly associated with CBA come not
from the values featured in environmental statutes, but from economics, which
emphasizes the value of economic efficiency.6 Much of the work questioning some
of the economic reforms, such as the work questioning CBA, offers technocratic
critiques of the proposed reform.7 Environmental law scholars, for example, have
argued that quantitative risk assessment and monetization of health and
environmental effects, which provide most of the technical foundation for CBA of
environmental regulations, have serious limitations. 8 These critiques make
important points, but they do not by themselves establish the existence, let alone the
desirability, of viable alternative forms of analysis emanating from environmental
law.
Douglas Kysar, in a thoughtful critique of CBA and the search for objectivity
underlying it, may speak for a lot of environmental lawyers when he emphasizes that
“[w]e already had a theory” of environmental law.9 Regulatory reformers’ writing,
however, does not suggest that they see this theory; it suggests instead that they often

MATERIAL ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–201, 395–936 (9th ed. 2014) (covering various
environmental statutes).
5
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1067 (2000) (claiming that CBA ensures the public demand for regulation is not
“rooted in myth”).
6
See Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L.
REV. 93, 100 (2015) (tracing CBA to its economic roots and utilitarianism with its goal of
maximizing “the overall welfare of members of society in the aggregate”). I use the term
CBA here to specify an analytical technique that aims to quantify as many of the costs and
benefits of a regulatory action as possible. Cf. id. at 97 (noting that the term may refer either
to highly formal quantitative analysis or to less formal analysis of “pros and cons”).
7
See id. at 105–07 (describing critics’ focus on measurement difficulties in formal
CBA).
8
See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61–90 (2004) (critiquing monetization of
health and environmental benefits); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk:
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 280
(1991) (describing quantitative risk assessment as providing the “framework” for CBA).
9
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 3 (2010).
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see a mass of complex statutory provisions exhibiting little rhyme or reason.10 And
Kysar himself, in the next sentence, hastens to admit that the theory we had was
“messy, pluralistic, and pragmatic.”11 Even if environmental lawyers had a theory,
it may be too messy to even be visible to anybody else. And visibility to nonspecialists matters. After all, the people making many of the most important
decisions shaping environmental law¾Congressmen, judges, and Presidents¾often
do not specialize in environmental law.
Furthermore, positive theory, unless explicitly articulated, may prove invisible
even to some scholars who devote substantial amounts of time to thinking about
environmental law. And even those who see a positive theory may not understand it
well absent a precise articulation of it.
This Article contributes to the construction of a positive theory of
environmental law by developing an account of the ends and means of pollution
control law. Environmental lawyers often use the term “environmental law”
narrowly to refer to pollution control law alone, but sometimes use this term more
capaciously to include natural resources law—the law governing the use of federal
lands. 12 Although natural resources law lies beyond the scope of this Article,
scholars in that field have found some of the elements of the theory developed here
useful in thinking about natural resources law.13 Yet, I am agnostic on the question
of whether we can construct a “unified field” theory that usefully unites
environmental and natural resources law. So, this Article focuses on environmental
law defined narrowly as pollution control law.
The theory discussed in this Article builds on concepts familiar to experts in
the field. Indeed, environmental law textbooks, including one that I coauthor,
usually mention the concepts that I rely on as building blocks for this theory.14 The
10

See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 744 (1999) (finding our approaches to risk regulation
“grossly inconsistent”).
11
KYSAR, supra note 9, at 3.
12
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, ROBERT W. ADLER & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 1 (3d ed. 2016) (noting its focus on
pollution control statutes while stating that a comprehensive course would address both
natural resources and pollution control law). The term pollution control law refers to law that
seeks to limit or clean up pollution, such as the Clean Air and Water Acts. 42 U.S.C.A §§
13101–13109 (West 2016); 33 U.S.C.A §§ 1251–1387 (West 2016). Statutes that limit
activities primarily to address ecological disturbances that do not involve only the release of
foreign substances into the environment, such as the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A
§§ 1531–1544, and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.A §§ 1701–
1787 (West 2016), fall within the domain of natural resources law.
13
See Robert L. Fischman & James Salzman, Lessons from Pollution Control:
Response to Heller and Hobbs 2014, 29 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 950, 950–51 (2015)
(positing that pollution control law’s use of technology-based regulation as a step toward
meeting effects-based ideals might have useful analogues for natural resource conservation).
14
See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 4, at 17–30 (discussing cost-benefit balancing, effectsbased standards, and technology-based standards); DRIESEN, ADLER & ENGEL, supra note
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goals discussed include the protection from environmental harm, the realization of
feasible emission reductions, and the balancing of pollution control’s costs and
benefits. Environmental law experts know that effects-based standards, technologybased standards, and cost-benefit balancing play a role in environmental law. 15
Similarly, the means of environmental protection emphasized here—performance
standards, work practice standards, phaseouts, emissions trading, and pollution
taxes—do not constitute new discoveries.16
Yet, environmental law experts do not share as clear an understanding of these
concepts as one might think. For example, take the idea of technology-based
standard setting—a form of standard setting that dominates environmental statutes.
Should we understand technology-based standard setting as a way of establishing
goals for environmental regulations or as a means of pollution control? To put the
question a little more precisely, do technology-based statutory provisions use
technological capabilities as a guide to the appropriate stringency of pollution
control standards, or do they dictate the technologies that polluters must use?
Analysts evince some disagreement, and some confusion, about some very basic
questions. 17 Thus, elucidating basic well-known concepts with some precision
facilitates discussion of important matters that have received insufficient attention
in the literature.
This Article’s most novel contribution, however, comes from using these
concepts to paint a picture of the field as a whole. While the Article’s primary
contribution is analytical and descriptive, rather than normative, the analysis used to
create this picture reveals some novel insights and a valuable research agenda that
includes normative questions. A fragmented literature discusses many of the core
concepts employed here individually, but does not bring them together to construct

12, at 85–294 (presenting chapters devoted to the concepts addressed in this Article);
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
152–156 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the concepts featured in this Article among others);
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND
SOCIETY (4th ed. 2010) (putting significant emphasis on these concepts).
15
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (identifying cost-benefit
based, health-based, and technology-based standards as the “three principle approaches for
determining the stringency of environmental protection”); Thomas O. McGarity, MediaQuality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Environmental Regulation,
46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159 (1983) (evaluating three different approaches to
environmental regulation: technology-based, cost-benefit-based, and media-quality-based).
16
See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 161–93 (3d ed.
2015) (discussing “command-and-control” regulation, effluent fees, and emissions trading).
17
See, e.g., March Sadowitz, Note, Tailoring Cost-Benefit Analysis to Environmental
Policy Goals: Technology- and Health Based Environmental Standards in the Age of CostBenefit Analysis, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 11, 16–17 (1996) (defining technology-based
standards as “mandat[ing] the use of a particular technology,” but then describing them two
paragraphs later as sometimes requiring a “level of discharge . . . regardless of the means”).
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a broader theory. We have, for example, a large literature on CBA, 18 a smaller
literature on technology-based standards,19 and a bit of a literature on effects-based
standards (supplemented by a large literature on the related idea of precaution and
technique of risk assessment).20 Bringing these goal concepts together allows an
exploration of the relationship among our goals, taking us closer to having a positive
theory of environmental law.21 Similarly, a large literature says something about one
or another of the means of environmental protection, but relationships among
various means of environmental protection remain underexamined. And the
relationship between ends and means has received still less attention. Thus, by
further developing frequently mentioned concepts and exploring their relationship
with each other and their placement within statutes, this Article provides an account
of the field as a whole, at least in terms of how we craft pollution control standards.
Any legal theory requires some simplification. Thus, the positive theory
developed here leaves out some details. Environmental law specialists may find
these omissions troubling, as we pride ourselves on mastery of the law’s details. Yet,
staring at each tree does not reveal a forest. A theory of sufficient generality to prove
useful in top-level policy debates and fundamental scholarship must make choices
emphasizing and explaining some details, especially those crucial to a proper
understating of core concepts, while leaving others. And the ideas circulating in toplevel policy debates may influence more fine-grained decisions that specialists might

18

See Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some
Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1136–39 (2008) (quantifying
legal scholarship focused on CBA).
19
See, e.g., Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 119, 131–32 (2003); David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2005); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric
A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 657–60 (2010); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based
Regulation, DUKE L.J. 729, 729–30 (1991); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of TechnologyBased Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 85 (2000).
20
See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Embracing a Precautionary Approach to Climate
Change, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 171 (David M. Driesen
ed., 2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THOUGHT]; THE BROOKINGS INST., QUANTITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION 1 (Lester B. Lave ed., 1982); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 9 (1983); THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS
1 (Paul Harremoës et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 20TH CENTURY PRECAUTION]; Donald T.
Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk
Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 562 (1992); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (1995).
21
See Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 529, 530–531 (2004) (employing a more elaborate typology and discussing the
relationships among goals).
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think arcane detail would control.22 A positive theory can inform important choices
if it has sufficient generality to prove useful to nonspecialists who make many key
decisions without fully understanding each relevant detail.23
This Article develops a theory of environmental law’s goals in part one. This
part discusses the concepts of effects-based, technology-based, and cost-benefit
based goals in turn. It shows how each of these goal-setting rubrics focuses on
different sets of information and therefore poses different challenges for regulators
establishing standards. It also discusses the normative values underlying these
concepts. Part one continues with an analysis of how environmental statutes employ
these concepts, thereby providing a picture of the normative structure of
environmental law as a whole, something missing from the literature. It closes by
showing how understanding environmental law’s goal concepts together yields new
insights and important research questions.
The second part describes the regulatory means of meeting these goals. It
discusses performance standards, work practice standards, phaseouts, emissions
trading, and pollution taxes. This part closes with an analysis of the positive theory
of instrument choice found embedded in the law governing means selection.
The third part shows that putting means and ends together enhances our
understanding of environmental law and reveals an important research agenda. For
example, instrument choice scholars often focus on the means of environmental
protection without explicitly engaging its ends. They usually describe emissions
trading as the opposite of technology-based standard setting. But recently scholars
studying emissions trading have found that regulators designing such programs often
employ technology-based rubrics to establish trading programs’ goals. 24 In other
words, emissions trading programs often are technology-based. Emissions trading’s
reliance on technology-based standard setting raises an important question about
22

See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 217, 220–21 (2009)
(construing a requirement that standards reflect “the best technology for minimizing
environmental impact” as allowing CBA, while expressing dismay about the complexity of
a contrary structural argument based on detailed statutory language).
23
I use the term “general policy choices” to refer to legislation and executive orders,
but to exclude administrative actions implementing general policy choices in particular
contexts. Thus, I claim that this positive theory can inform rational deliberation about ends.
See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 6 (1994)
(defending rationale deliberation of ends as rational). At the same time, I do not claim that
the concepts here necessarily suffice to fully justify all, or even most, administrative
decisions about particular applications See id. at 150–54 (discussing the challenges of
making coherent explanations for actions, while insisting that satisfactory explanations bear
some relationship to broader aims).
24
See, e.g., Heinrich Tschochohei & Zan Zöckler, Business and Emissions Trading
from a Public Choice Perspective-Waiting for a New Paradigm to Emerge, in EMISSIONS
TRADING: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DECISION MAKING AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 21, 28–
31 (Ralf Antes et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that the European Union (EU) emissions trading
scheme “reflects a command-and-control approach” because of technology-based
allocation).
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what changes in normative orientation might be needed to allow emissions trading
to more fully realize some of its proponents’ environmental ambitions. For scholars
promoting emissions trading had hoped that it would free regulators from the task
of evaluating appropriate technologies, which they hoped to leave to regulated firms
with superior plant-specific expertise. 25 This question about emissions trading’s
normative orientation matters a great deal to climate disruption law in particular,
because it has relied heavily on emissions trading, with somewhat disappointing
results so far.26
The fourth part issues an invitation to build on the theory of ends and means
articulated in this Article to create a more complete theory of environmental law. It
identifies some core components of a broader theory that this Article does not have
space to address. It also raises the question of how we should understand
environmental justice’s relationship to a positive theory of environmental law.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S ENDS
This Article relies on a dual conception of environmental law’s goals. First,
when Congress writes an environmental statute it presumably has some purposes in
mind, which serve as goals for the statute as a whole. Sometimes, Congress sets out
goals in the first few sections of a statute, but they may also emerge from legislative
history or statutory design. 27 Second, Congress usually spells out criteria for
standard setting in statutes, which guide administrative agency decisions about how
much pollution control to demand in particular regulations.28 Criteria guiding these
stringency determinations establish goals for particular regulations. This Article
treats both the goals of entire statutes and the criteria governing the stringency of
particular pollution control decisions as goals for environmental law.
25

See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985) (arguing that emissions trading transfers the
job of assessing technologies from “bureaucrats” to “business managers”).
26
See JONAS DREGER, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY:
A CLIMATE OF EXPERTISE? 64 (2014) (discussing a strong academic consensus that the
European Union’s emissions trading scheme failed during its first few years). I use the term
“climate disruption” in lieu of the more conventional terms “climate change” and “global
warming” because “climate disruption” captures the reasons that climate scientists fear the
particular changes associated with increasing average mean surface temperatures. See
DRIESEN, ADLER, & ENGEL, supra note 12, at 24 (explaining why White House science
advisor John Holdren finds the term “climate disruption” more accurate than the
alternatives).
27
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A §§ 6902(a), 7401(b) (West 2016); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246, 259 (1976) (citing legislative history indicating that Congress considered
protection of the “health of persons” as Congress’ responsibility).
28
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001)
(explaining that Congress requires national ambient air quality standards to be adequate to
protect public health and has therefore precluded consideration of cost in setting these
standards).
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Specifying means and ends does not constitute an exact science because goals
can be stated at a variety of levels of generality.29 Stating a goal at a very high level
of generality can make plausible a claim that slightly less general criteria constitute
means toward a yet more general end.30 Thus, for example, one might posit a very
general goal for environmental law of improving life on earth. Described this way,
an analyst might see the goals of environmental statutes as means of achieving this
larger goal. If one states the goals of environmental law a little less generally as, for
example, protecting public health and the environment, then one might see criteria
guiding actual stringency determinations for particular pollutants as means toward
that end. So, this dual conception is not inevitable.
Yet, this Article’s dual conception of goals has several advantages. Importantly
for a positive theory, this goal definition relies on legal texts, especially statutes. A
goal that has no or little support in legal texts probably has no place in a positive
theory of environmental law, as such a goal does not describe the law so much as
seek to give it new normative foundations. While there is nothing wrong with
normative theory, this Article seeks to help establish a positive theory of
environmental law.
This Article treats statutory criteria guiding the stringency of standards set by
administrative agencies as goals because decisions about pollution control
standards’ stringency determine what compliant polluters will achieve in practice.
The criteria governing agency decisions about stringency therefore guide decisions
about what we should try to achieve. When we speak of a goal, we generally mean
an understanding of what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, the statutory criteria
governing decisions about the stringency of standards are most usefully thought of
as establishing goals for administrative agencies developing pollution control
standards. The analysis below also reveals that this dual conception yields insights
into environmental law’s conceptual structure and core normative dilemmas. Thus,
even though one might view the criteria governing standard setting as a means of
achieving a statute’s overall goal, this Article initially treats such criteria as goals of
environmental law, but later considers these criteria’s relationship to statutes’
overall goals.
In particular, this part focuses on effects-based standards, feasibility-based
standards, and cost-benefit based standards in turn. It then closes by describing some
insights and research questions that this discussion reveals.

29

See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 876–77 (1930)
(pointing out that a statute’s purpose can be conceived at varying levels of generality).
30
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2016–17 (2009) (noting that one can plausibly
identify the aim of any statute as securing “justice and security” and suggesting that doing
so permits the reaching of arbitrary results).
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A. Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Effects-Based Standards
Several statutes and statutory provisions have the goal of protecting public
health and the environment. Environmental lawyers refer to standards enacted under
statutory provisions explicitly aiming to protect public health and the environment
as effects-based standards because these standards have a goal of avoiding harmful
environmental effects.31
1. Examples
The Clean Air Act (CAA)32 and Clean Water Act (CWA)33 have the explicit
goals of protecting public health and the environment. These goals appear as general
goals for the statutes as a whole and in some key provisions governing standard
setting.
The CAA’s very first section declares a “purpose” of “protect[ing] and
enhanc[ing] the . . . Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”34 This language establishes a
goal of protecting air quality in order to achieve the more general goals of promoting
public health and welfare.35 Thus, the CAA embraces a goal of protecting public
health.36
It also embraces a goal of environmental protection. The Act protects air quality
not only to promote public health, but also to improve public “welfare.” The CAA,
however, defines welfare not only in terms of economic welfare, but also in terms
of environmental quality.37 Thus, the statute promotes “welfare” by protecting the
environment from air pollution.
The CAA’s main operative provisions reinforce this reading of the statute’s
overall goals.38 The CAA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
establish primary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) to protect public
health with an “adequate margin of safety.”39 It also requires “secondary” NAAQS
to protect public welfare (i.e. the environment) from “known or anticipated adverse
31

See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 465 (holding that the CAA’s health-based air
quality standards must be set at levels corresponding with the “maximum . . . concentration
. . . that the public health can tolerate” decreased by a margin of safety).
32
42 U.S.C.A §§ 7401–7671q (West 2016).
33
33 U.S.C.A §§ 1251–1387 (West 2016).
34
42 U.S.C.A § 7401(b)(1) (West 2016).
35
See id.
36
See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 466 (explaining that the CAA protects the “health of
the public”).
37
See 42 U.S.C.A § 7602(h) (West 2016) (discussing inter alia effects on “soils, water,
crops, vegetation . . . animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate”).
38
See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469 (2004)
(describing attainment of health-based air quality standards as the “aim[]” of the CAA).
39
42 U.S.C.A §§ 7409(a)–(b) (West 2016).
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effects.”40 These provisions direct EPA to establish concrete goals that states must
achieve through comprehensive pollution control programs. 41 These national
“ambient” standards specify the level of pollution allowed in the ambient air—the
air around us—in parts per million of pollution.42 States must then reduce emissions
from particular pollution sources to the extent necessary to achieve these effectsbased numerical goals.43 Thus, the CAA embraces the goals of protecting public
health and the environment.44
The CWA has even stronger and more explicit environmental protection goals.
Its first section declares an “objective” of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 45 Thus, it
establishes ecological integrity as an environmental goal. It then explicitly sets out
ambitious subsidiary goals useful to obtaining this broad ecological goal. These
goals include the elimination of discharges by 1985, the protection of fish and
wildlife by 1983, and the elimination of toxic pollution in toxic amounts—showing
an intent to fully protect water quality from environmental harm.46
The CWA also contains operational provisions that aim to carry out the Act’s
water quality goals. For it requires states to establish water quality standards roughly
analogous to the CAA’s NAAQS.47 These effects-based standards must protect the
water so that people can use it for purposes states embrace and must be consistent
with the statute’s ecological goals. 48 The CWA envisions state regulation of
particular pollution sources to obtain these water quality standards.49
40

42 U.S.C.A § 7409(b)(2) (West 2016).
See Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65–67 (1975) (describing
requirements that states adopt implementation plans providing for the attainment of the
NAAQS).
42
See id. at 78 (explaining that the NAAQS “deal with the quality of the outdoor air”).
43
See id. (discussing the requirement that states develop “emission limitations” to limit
pollution from “power plants, service stations, and the like” to achieve the NAAQS).
44
See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (describing the requirement
that states formulate plan to achieve standards designed to protect public health as the “heart”
of the CAA); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851–52
(1984) (finding economic purposes relevant to section 117 of the CAA).
45
33 U.S.C.A§ 1251(a) (West 2016).
46
Id. §§ 1251(a)(1)–(3).
47
See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704
(1994) (discussing requirement that states establish water quality standards); cf. Miss.
Comm’n on Nat. Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that states
have the primary responsibility for establishing water quality standards, but that EPA reviews
them for compliance with the CWA); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water
Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 206 (1999)
(discussing the NAAQS and water quality standards as two examples of ambient effectsbased standards).
48
See 33 U.S.C.A § 1313(c)(2) (West 2016).
49
See Adler, supra note 47, at 215–40 (describing the requirements for state realization
of water quality goals).
41
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Similarly, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) has a goal
of promoting “protection of health and the environment and to conserve” natural
resources. 50 It seeks to achieve this health and environmental protection goal by
prohibiting open dumping, converting existing open dumps to “facilities” posing no
“danger to the environment or to health,” and “assuring” that hazardous waste
management “protects human health and the environment.”51
Environmental statutes not only employ effects-based standards as goals for
state pollution control programs. They also include some statutory provisions,
especially provisions regulating toxic pollution, that seek explicitly to protect public
health and the environment from specific pollution sources. A fairly typical
provision requires pollution levels that protect public health with an ample margin
of safety.52
2. Analytical Features
An effects-based standard requires the assessment of pollution’s environmental
and/or health effects in order to determine what level of pollution to tolerate.53 Thus,
effects-based standards require either quantitative or qualitative risk assessment. So,
for example, if a standard seeks to protect public health from a carcinogenic
pollutant, a regulatory agency may seek to determine how often that pollutant will
cause cancer at various levels. 54 The agency must then use this information to
establish standards that avoid a significant number of cancer cases.55
Scientific uncertainty, however, usually makes it difficult to set standards based
on protecting public health or the environment.56 Indeed, this difficulty has helped
50

See 42 U.S.C.A § 6902(a) (West 2016).
42 U.S.C.A § 6902(a)(3)–(4) (West 2016).
52
See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(describing residual risk standards for hazardous air pollutants under the 1990 CAA
Amendments as protecting public health with an ample margin of safety); Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that EPA must establish
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants that protect public health with an “ample
margin of safety”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(describing EPA’s responsibility to provide an “ample margin of safety” from toxic water
pollution as the toxics section’s “polestar”).
53
See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 520–522 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(finding that EPA failed to adequately take into account health effects when it rejected
reliance on short-term exposure studies).
54
See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1618–19 (describing regulation based on health effects
as trying to achieve a quantitative limit on the amount of risk).
55
Cf. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392–393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing EPA
health-based standard because EPA did not protect asthmatics from events triggering a need
for hospitalization, medication, and disruption of some ongoing activities).
56
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in
Protective Environmental Decision Making, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 327 (1991)
(characterizing risk assessment as “inevitably . . . characterized by uncertainty”); Wagner,
51
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partially paralyze standard setting for toxic substances.57 We generally do not have
data that can tell us precisely what health and environmental consequences occur at
various levels of tolerated pollution.58 Most attempts to associate particular pollution
levels with particular environmental and health consequences require extrapolation
from very limited data based on models, and usually our understanding of
pollution’s effects provides little basis for knowing how to do this extrapolation.59
Thus, in practice, effects-based standards usually require acceptance of agency
guesses about the risk of pollution at various levels, and the controversy around
those guesses sometimes proves paralyzing.60
On the other hand, establishing a safe level does not require consideration of
pollution control costs. 61 For example, if we know that an air pollutant causes a
significant number of cancer cases at three parts per million (ppm), we cannot allow
pollution exceeding three ppm under a statutory provision demanding protection of
public health from air pollution.62 If it turns out that reducing pollution below three
supra note 20, at 1614–15 (describing efforts to base standards on the science of health and
environmental protection as a “failure”).
57
See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1677–1681 (explaining that efforts to base standards
on unresolvable scientific determinations produces a great amount of inaction and delay);
see, e.g., Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology-Based Standards, 16 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 30 (2005) (attributing EPA’s failure to regulate hazardous air
pollutants under “the early health-based scheme . . . in large part to EPA’s difficulty in
deciding . . . which level of pollution should be deemed ‘safe’”). Cf. John P. Dwyer, The
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 251–260 (1990) (describing
EPA’s efforts to cope with the difficulties of implementing this health-based scheme).
58
See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1619–22 (explaining why scientific data does not
usually establish the precise risk a substance poses to humans).
59
See id. at 1625–27 (explaining the need for scientifically non-verifiable assumptions
to guide extrapolations from experimental data regarding health effects of high dose
exposure in laboratory animals to predict effects upon large populations of human beings
experiencing exposures to low doses).
60
See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1307–
08 (1985) (explaining that EPA failed to promulgate effects-based effluent standards for
toxic water pollutants because of insufficient data to determine safe levels).
61
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470–71 (2001) (holding that
the CAA bars consideration of costs and therefore cost-benefit analysis for establishing a
NAAQS because it directs EPA to protect public health and the environment); Union Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) (holding that considerations of cost and feasibility are
wholly foreign to review of state implementation plans to meet the health-based NAAQS);
see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978) (holding that the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the protection of species from extinction “whatever
the cost”).
62
Deciding what constitutes a “significant number” of cancer cases requires a policy
judgment, but cost is also irrelevant to that policy judgment. If we conclude that 100 cancer
cases are significant they do not become insignificant just because we discover that avoiding
them would prove costly.
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ppm proves insanely costly, we might wish as a policy matter to refrain from
reducing pollution below three ppm. But if we planned to follow a policy of
protecting public health, we would have to reduce the level below three ppm
regardless. Cost is irrelevant to the question we ask when engaged in effects-based
standard setting, what level of the pollutant being regulated is safe.63
The fact that we usually will not know exactly how many cancer cases occur at
three ppm (or any other level) does not undermine the point that cost’s magnitude is
irrelevant to standard setting if the standard setting seeks to establish a safe level of
pollution. The uncertainty just means that the regulator seeking to establish a safe
level will have to make some judgment under uncertainty about what levels might
be safe. That fact does not make costs relevant to determining what levels are safe.64
In some cases, the only safe level might be a zero level of pollution. 65 In
practice, administrators may well resist zero levels because they imagine that a zero
pollution requirement may cause a regulated industry to shutdown, which would
pose political problems for the agency. But that political consideration does not
undermine the basic point that if a zero level is the only safe level then an agency
must prohibit all pollution if it plans to implement a command to only permit safe
levels of pollution.66 The resistance to a zero level of pollution, in this context on
grounds of costs, constitutes a departure from a command to protect public health
and the environment. Protection of public health and the environment from targeted
pollution demands, in principle, that agencies ignore costs.
63

See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 470–71 (holding that EPA may not consider cost when
establishing a NAAQS because the statute requires protection of public health and the
environment); cf. Natural Res. Defense Council (NRDC), Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (forbidding the consideration of cost in determining a safe level of emissions
because this is consistent with the statutory emphasis on safety). Judge Bork’s opinion for
the court in NRDC went on to suggest that EPA may consider cost in deciding what margin
of safety should be provided beyond the safe level. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1165–66 (stating that
EPA may consider feasibility in deciding how much of a margin to leave below a “safe”
level of reductions). This dictum appears to conflict with the subsequent Supreme Court
decision in American Trucking and appears incoherent, as the question of safety cannot be
separated from the methodologies used to provide a margin of safety under prevailing
conditions of uncertainty. See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 570–71 (holding EPA may
not consider cost in protecting public health with an adequate margin of safety); NRDC, 824
F.2d at 1165 n.11 (not requiring a two-step methodology separating safety from an ample
margin of safety and recognizing that statistical methods may obviate the distinction).
64
See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that the requirement to deal with
scientific uncertainty through an “adequate margin of safety” does not permit consideration
of cost).
65
Accord NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1165 (requiring EPA to set a standard of zero emissions
if there is no level generating an “acceptable risk”).
66
See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 259 (1976) (explaining that Congress in
requiring achievement of health-based air quality standards by a date certain had decided
that plants should “meet the standard . . . or be closed down”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196,
2–3 (1970)).
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3. Normative Underpinning
Accordingly, the choice of an effects-based goal embraces a normative
commitment to health and environmental protection. It gives that commitment
primacy over competing values.67
B. Maximizing Feasible Reductions: Technology-Based Standards.
Many environmental statutes rely heavily on provisions that seek to maximize
feasible reductions.68 Many of these provisions, as I have argued elsewhere, are best
understood as embodying a feasibility principle, which aims to maximize pollution
reductions subject to a presumptive prohibition of regulations causing widespread
plant shutdowns.69
1. Examples
The CWA’s Best Available Technology (BAT) program, which often serves as
the main example of technology-based regulation in the literature, exemplifies this
feasibility principle.70 The CWA demands “effluent limitations . . . , which (i) shall
require the application of the best available technology economically achievable.”71
This provision requires the “elimination” of pollution “if . . . technologically and
economically achievable.” 72 This elimination language implies that if EPA can
demand elimination of a pollutant without widespread plant shutdowns it should do
so, but that it must, at least presumptively, refrain from establishing demanding
requirements like a zero limit when such limits would cause widespread shutdowns.
The demand for feasibility implies that some pollution limits—presumably those
many plants can only attain by shutting down—are infeasible.
Similarly, the provision governing technology-based standards for hazardous
air pollutants under the 1990 CAA Amendments exemplifies the feasibility
principle. It demands that EPA “require the maximum degree of reductions in
emissions . . . that the Administrator . . . determines is achievable.”73 Many other
67

Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity and Change: An
Ecopragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q.
105, 108 (2006) (describing risk-based approaches as “absolutist”).
68
Driesen, supra note 19, at 20–22 (providing examples of statutory provisions
requiring maximization of feasible reductions).
69
See id. at 8–22 (describing the feasibility principle as requiring maximization of
reductions subject to a presumption against widespread plant shutdowns).
70
See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1334–35 (describing BAT as the
“primary basis” for the “existing system of pollution regulation”).
71
33 U.S.C.A §1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2016).
72
Id.
73
42 U.S.C.A§7412(d)(2) (West 2016).
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statutory provisions instruct administrative agencies to write standards that
maximize economically and technologically feasible reductions in pollution.74 And
EPA has sometimes interpreted provisions that lack superlatives requiring it to
“maximize” reductions or base standards on the “best” technology—such as
requirements for standards based on “reasonably available control technology”—as
similarly demanding maximization of reductions to some extent.75
2. Analytical Features
We might think of technology-based standards as the analytical opposite of
effects-based standards. 76 Setting them requires evaluation of technological and
economic feasibility, but no analysis of health and environmental effects. 77 This
“feasibility analysis” requires identification of potential pollution control techniques
and then assessment of their pollution control potential, basically a question of
engineering. The statutory provisions governing technology-based standard setting,
however, clearly allow imposition of requirements not based on end-of-pipe

74

See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509–510 (1981)
(holding that OSHA demands a feasibility analysis and does not contemplate CBA).
75
See McGarity, supra note 21, at 543 (noting that EPA interprets requirements for
“reasonably available control technology” to demand “the lowest emission limitation”
attainable through use of feasible technology) (emphasis added).
76
See, e.g., Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163–64 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (reversing an EPA decision using an analysis of technology and its cost as a
predicate for regulation under an effects-based statutory provision); see generally Adler,
supra note 47, at 206–07 (describing technology-based and environmentally protective
standards as “philosophically different” strategies because the former focuses on “economic
and technological feasibility” whilst the latter “are set at levels . . . necessary to protect
human health and environmental quality”).
77
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (contrasting riskbased and technology-based regulation); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress replaced EPA’s health-based regulation of hazardous
air pollutants “with a . . . technology-based regulatory scheme”). Patricia McCubbin
concedes that a “literal reading” of the CWA supports the idea that EPA should not consider
environmental benefits in establishing BAT standards. See McCubbin, supra note 57, at 15.
Nevertheless, she argues that the law does not mean what it says because considering cost
without considering benefits would illogically lead to the conclusion that paying any cost for
technological improvement is “unacceptable.” Id. This argument is incorrect. It assumes that
no costs should be imposed unless CBA shows that the benefits outweigh the costs. Id. But
nothing in the statute or the legislative history supports that idea. See id. (citing legislative
history rejecting CBA).
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controls.78 And some technology-based standards reflect evaluation of technological
changes other than end-of-the-pipe controls.79
Feasibility analysis requires not only evaluation of technological possibilities,
but also an assessment of the cost of employing promising pollution control
techniques. 80 Regulators can then compare these cost estimates to the economic
capabilities of regulated facilities to ensure that the promulgated pollution reduction
requirements do not offend the feasibility constraint by causing widespread plant
shutdowns. 81 Feasibility analysis, however, does not require assessment of
environmental and health effects. It does not compare costs to the benefits of
pollution control, but rather to the economic capabilities of facilities.82
Environmental law experts agree that this analytical task usually proves much
more manageable than the assessment of environmental and health effects required
for effects-based standard setting.83 Yet, agencies frequently must cope with some
uncertainty about how well technologies will work in new contexts and they often
end up overestimating costs because of the difficulty of anticipating innovation.84
But in several instances, EPA has been unable to make much progress with effectsbased standards, but moved ahead when Congress or the courts authorized a
technology-based approach.85 For example, EPA only regulated eight hazardous air
pollutants in the 1970s and ‘80s when the CAA required its hazardous air pollutant

78

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A §§7412(d)(2), 7429(a)(3) (West 2016).
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §63.1213 (2016); Nat’l Ass’n for Surface Finishing v. EPA, 795
F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing EPA’s revision of a technology-based standard to
reflect demonstrated ability to phase out a toxic fume suppressant).
80
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001) (discussing
technology-based statutory provisions requiring or authorizing the consideration of cost).
81
See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 837 (5th Cir. 2010) (observing
that EPA assessed the cost’s likely impact on the regulated industry without comparing costs
to benefits).
82
Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 498 (2004) (rejecting
claim that a pollution limit was infeasible when the regulated company failed to provide
“financial data” showing the cost’s impact on the “operation and competitiveness” of the
regulated mine) (internal quotations omitted).
83
See Angelo, supra note 67, at 129 (stating that technology-based standards have
“worked best”); Adam Babich, supra note 19; McGarity, supra note 15; Shapiro & McGarity,
supra note 19; Wagner, supra note 19, at 85.
84
See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998, 2048–49 (2002) (finding that ex
ante cost estimates have usually been higher than actual costs incurred and attributing this,
in part, to unanticipated innovation); see, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431–
33 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (putting a burden on EPA to justify a conclusion that other plants in an
industry can meet standards already obtained by some plants).
85
See, e.g., EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202–03
(1976) (pointing out that Congress adopted technology-based standards to cure problems in
implementing and enforcing effects-based standards for water pollution).
79
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standards to protect public health.86 Congress, fed up, amended the statute in 1990
to require a round of technology-based rulemaking before the agency resumed
setting effects-based standards (if needed). 87 EPA established an array of
technology-based standards regulating almost 200 pollutants.88 Technology-based
standards have proven less analytically burdensome than effects-based standards.89
3. Normative Underpinning
The feasibility principle takes cost into account, but focuses on the distribution
of costs, seeking to avoid widespread unemployment as it otherwise maximizes
environmental and health protection.90 It seeks to avoid environmental and health
problems that can cause devastating losses to some individuals without causing
significant unemployment, which may constitute a similarly important disruption of
affected workers’ lives.91 The feasibility principle gives health and environmental
protection a high priority but reflects reluctance to cause perhaps equally serious
hardships by causing widespread plant shutdowns.
C. Optimal Pollution: Cost-Benefit Based Standards
Cost-benefit balancing plays an increasing role in environmental law. The
standard justification for such balancing involves a search for optimal pollution
levels—defined as a level of pollution reduction that balances costs and benefits at
the margin.

86

See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir.

2008).

87

See id. (stating that Congress sought to hasten the process of standard setting by
listing pollutants itself and then requiring technology-based regulation of them).
88
See id. (noting that the 1990 CAA Amendments listed 191 substances for regulation);
EPA, NATIONAL AIR TOXICS PROGRAM: THE SECOND INTEGRATED AIR TOXICS REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at xiii (2014) (stating that EPA has issued 97 technology-based standards
regulating 174 major categories of major sources of hazardous air pollutants).
89
The CWA has a similar history. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1307–1308 (1985) (discussing the failure of health-based standards
for toxic water pollutants and the substitution of technology-based standards).
90
See Driesen, supra note 19, at 34–35 (characterizing the feasibility principle as
focusing on the distribution of costs to determine significance).
91
See id. at 37 (pointing out that costs forcing plant closures “can have a devastating
impact on workers’ lives”).

2017]

THE ENDS AND MEANS OF POLLUTION CONTROL

75

1. Examples
The environmental statutes do not require optimal pollution levels.92 Yet, costbenefit balancing has entered environmental law, primarily through court decisions
and executive orders seeking to avoid overly burdensome pollution reduction
requirements.
The courts have required cost-benefit balancing for standard setting under the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)93 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),94 both of which demand protection from “unreasonable
risk.”95 The most recent executive order, like its predecessors, also requires CBA “to
the extent permitted by law” and authorizes White House oversight of this
requirement through the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 96 Finally, in 1996 Congress amended the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to include CBA.97
Despite CBA’s role in court decisions, executive orders, and the SDWA,
examples of standards set through cost-benefit balancing prove hard to come by.98
The decision interpreting TSCA to demand cost-benefit balancing led to a halt of
final rules under TSCA’s main standard setting provision, probably because the
analytical burdens imposed made standard setting impracticable. 99 Congress
recognized this problem and updated TSCA in 2016 to require health protective
standards, while paradoxically continuing to require CBA.100
92

See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 710 n.27
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing statutes requiring a “reasonable relation between
costs and benefits” but not mentioning any requirement for optimal emission reductions).
93
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring EPA
to evaluate each regulatory option’s costs and benefits).
94
Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing
FIFRA as a cost-benefit statute); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (approving EPA’s decision to allow some uses of heptachlor and chlordane based
on CBA); cf. Angelo, supra note 67, at 162 (noting that EPA has interpreted FIFRA to require
cost-benefit balancing even though FIFRA does not “mandate . . . a strict cost/benefit
analysis”).
95
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006); 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)–(D); 136d(b) (West
2016).
96
Exec. Order No. 13,563 §1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
97
See 42 U.S.C.A. §300g-1(b)(3)(C) (West 2016).
98
Cf. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,603
(July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 9, 122–25) (applying a cost-benefit test to water
intake regulations under the CWA).
99
See Angelo, supra note 67, at 132 n.100 (finding that FIFRA stands virtually alone
in employing a cost/benefit approach because the Fifth Circuit’s TSCA decision imposing
CBA rendered TSCA “impotent”); Sinden, supra note 6, at 130 n.128 (noting that “TSCA
has come to a grinding halt” in the wake of the 5th Circuit decision overturning EPA’s
asbestos ban based on CBA).
100
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a), (b)(4), (c)(2)(A)(iv)(II) (West 2016).
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The executive orders only permit CBA “to the extent permitted by law” and the
major pollution control statutes rely heavily on technology-based and effects-based
goal setting.101 As a result, CBA under the executive orders usually provides an input
into debates between regulatory agencies and OIRA about what standards the
agencies should promulgate, but the agencies generally do not justify their standards
through cost-benefit balancing. 102 The SDWA demands CBA and has not
thoroughly paralyzed rulemaking, but it only permits CBA in very limited situations
and does not require cost-benefit balancing.103
2. Analytical Features
CBA requires a broad assessment of a proposed standard’s consequences,
which combines all of the analytical difficulties of effects-based standard setting
with those of technology-based standard setting and then adds another step, that of
monetization.104 As a result, CBA creates an extremely difficult analytical burden.105
In order to identify the benefits of pollution control decisions, the analyst
conducting CBA must associate particular pollution reductions with specific health
and environmental consequences. Although administrative agencies sometimes base
effects-based standards on qualitative risk assessment, the need to compare costs
with benefits makes quantitative risk assessment essential. 106 The problem of
uncertainty making reasonably precise quantitative prediction impossible for
effects-standard setting arises in the cost-benefit context as well.107
CBA also requires an estimate of the pollution costs that polluters will incur in
order to achieve a particular level of reduction. This control cost estimate almost

101

Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(requiring application of cost-benefit principles “to the extent permitted by law”).
102
Cf. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (upholding one use
of CBA under the CWA).
103
See City of Portland, v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting CBA
cannot be used to establish a less stringent treatment technique for Cryptosporidium than the
most stringent feasible); Sinden, supra note 6, at 40–41 (describing the SDWA as
authorizing, but not requiring, departures from the feasibility principle based on CBA).
104
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 8, at 35–40 (explaining and critiquing
the role of monetization in CBA); David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One
Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10019 n.204 (explaining
why CBA is more analytically difficult than feasibility analysis).
105
See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 134 (1991) (discussing information
gaps respecting costs and benefits).
106
See Applegate, supra note 8, at 281–82 (describing the move from qualitative and
quantitative risk assessment as facilitating CBA to limit federal regulatory action).
107
See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 837, 842 (5th Cir. 2010)
(upholding EPA’s decision not to employ CBA because it could not reliably estimate
ecosystem benefits).
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always requires the same form of analysis used in technology-based rulemaking.108
In order to predict the costs of a particular required level of pollution control, the
regulator must evaluate the technological changes needed to achieve that level of
control. It can then estimate the cost of employing the needed technological
changes.109
Finally, in order to compare costs and benefits, the analyst must translate
quantitative estimates of pollution controls’ benefits—saved lives, avoided illness,
and reduced ecological destruction—into dollar terms. This monetization process
has proven controversial, difficult, and sometimes impossible. 110 Scholars have
thoroughly debated this point and a review of the details of this debate will not
contribute much to the elucidation of a positive theory of environmental law as a
whole.111 The main point for positive theory is simply that CBA creates analytical
burdens surpassing those of combining the burdens associated with effects-based
standards with the burdens encountered in establishing technology-based standards.
3. Normative Underpinning
Although the core normative theory that one might imagine underpins costbenefit based standard setting appears clear enough, specifying the positive theory
underlying its place in environmental law proves difficult. Most scholars associate
CBA with allocative efficiency—the idea that policy makers should require an
108

Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, in
ECONOMIC THOUGHT, supra note 20, at 213, 217–19 (pointing out that some economy-wide
cost estimates for greenhouse gas reduction use “top-down” approaches that base prediction
on past macroeconomic behavior rather than technological capability).
109
See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 84, at 2003 (discussing EPA guidance for
CBA’s reliance on studies of pollution control costs in “representative factories”).
110
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 100–01 (2016) (showing that
between 2010 and 2013 government agencies fully quantified the costs and benefits of only
two rules and could not quantify any benefits in 36 rules); See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling,
supra note 8 (describing the difficulty in monetizing ecological effects); Clive L. Spash &
Alex Y. Lo, Australia’s Carbon Tax: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 23 ECON. & LAB. REL.
REV. 67, 67–69 (2016) (characterizing calculation of climate disruption’s “monetary costs
and benefits” as “impossible”).
111
See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55–59 (1993);
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
1–7 (1988); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–
41 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CAL. L.
REV. 1457, 1465–67 (2014) (criticizing an effort to quantify the value of rape); John M.
Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995); Douglas
Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Law, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Life, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 941, 955–86 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law,
92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 841–42 (1994).

78

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

efficient level of pollution control defined as a level that generates equal costs and
benefits at the margin.112 The idea of allocative efficiency treats a pollution control
decision, not as protection from serious harm, but as the purchase of an
environmental benefit. And it reflects a concern that we not pay too much for this
benefit.
Environmental law, however, does not endorse the pursuit of allocative
efficiency as a goal, as the cases and executive orders creating obligations to carry
out CBA do not set up a cost-benefit equilibrium as an explicit goal for standards.113
The current executive order on CBA, for example, demands “to the extent permitted
by law” that regulatory benefits “justify” regulatory costs.114 The executive order
also references the allocative efficiency test, admonishing agencies to choose
“regulatory approaches” that “maximize net benefits.”115 The reference to regulatory
approaches, however, suggests that this efficiency criterion applies not to goal
setting, but to choices about the means of environmental protection. Furthermore,
this subsection of the executive order defines costs and benefits to include
“distributive impacts . . . and equity,” thereby clearly rejecting establishment of a
pure allocative efficiency test.116
The positive law of CBA suggests a demand that the costs of environmental
actions should not greatly exceed the benefits. The Supreme Court has endorsed this
test, and it comports with the executive order’s main test¾the benefits-justify-costs
test.117 It also aligns with a view of congressional intent with respect to FIFRA that
112

See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 67, at 121 (characterizing CBA as “elevat[ing]
economic efficiency above all other considerations”); Sinden, supra note 6, at 104
(associating CBA with identifying the “point at which marginal costs just equal marginal
benefits”).
113
See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 217, 224 (2009) (finding that
the EPA did not seek equilibrium but employed a “significantly greater than” standard in
analyzing costs and benefits in a rulemaking predicated on CBA); EPA v. Nat’l Crushed
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (citing CWA legislative history suggesting that
cost-benefit analysis may identify situations where benefits would be “wholly out of
proportion to the costs”); National Ass’n of Homebuilders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1039
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that EPA does not have a duty under TSCA to show that its rule’s
benefits “outweigh” its costs even though it conducted a CBA); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,
590 F.2d 1011, 1041 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that Congress rejected the concept of
optimal pollution control even under a statutory provision requiring a comparison between
costs and effluent reduction benefits).
114
Exec. Order No. 13,563 §1(b)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (January 18, 2011).
115
Id. §1(b)(3).
116
Id.
117
See Entergy, 556 U.S. at 224–25 (approving a normative criterion precluding
regulation generating compliance costs “significantly greater” than benefits); see also Ass’n
of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980) (promulgating the best
practicable technology standards under the Clean Water Act EPA may only rely on a costbenefit comparison to relax a standard when “costs are wholly disproportionate to effluent
reduction” benefits); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
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reads its cost-benefit language as only tolerating reasonably adverse effects when
“overriding benefits” exist—such as controlling pests that no safer pesticide could
possibly control.118
This gross disproportion principle differs from the effects-based principle, as it
would allow serious harms to the environment or public health if wholly preventing
such harms proved disproportionately costly. It also differs from the feasibility
principle because it would permit serious environmental harms even when
preventing them would not lead to widespread plant shutdowns. Notice that this test,
however, does not function as a stand-alone test. It only constitutes a restraint on
stringency and never demands that regulators address environmental hazards at all.
By contrast, the other tests, and the allocative efficiency principle not found in
environmental law, would demand some sort of minimum stringency.119 As a result,
this gross disproportion principle does not govern goal setting on its own, but sets
up a restraint on other more complete normative criteria.
Some analysts may object to this identification of the gross disproportion
principle as the standard found in the positive law on CBA on the ground that OIRA
in practice imposes a much stricter test. It may well insist that costs not exceed
quantified benefits even in the face of important unquantified benefits or even
demand a reverse showing, that benefits far outweigh costs.120 But this Article does

667 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (reading the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
as requiring a “reasonable relationship” between a standard’s costs and its benefits); cf. Am.
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506–11 (1981) (rejecting argument that OSHA
requires a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 21, 120 (2002)
(identifying the benefits-justify-costs test with costs not exceeding benefits in most cases but
commending a judicial test based on cost not being grossly disproportionate to benefits).
118
See Angelo, supra note 67, at 176–77 (explaining the support for this reading in
FIFRA’s legislative history); see, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005–12
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding a decision to suspend some applications of a pesticide and not
others based primarily on the availability of safer substitutes for some applications); In re
Protexall Products, Inc., 2 E.A.D. 854 (E.P.A. July 26, 1989) (approving cancellation of a
pesticide when applicant could not prove that the pesticide’s benefits justified the health risks
because it could not show any benefit not provided by safer pesticides); In re Chapman
Chem. Co., 1 E.A.D. 199 (E.P.A. February 17, 1976) (finding a pesticide’s risks outweigh
its benefits in applications where safer pesticides performed the same function, but that its
benefits outweigh the risks where it performed functions not performed by safer pesticides).
119
See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 15, at 1234–46 (showing that optimal pollution
levels for many NAAQS are often more stringent than the level EPA identifies as health
protective).
120
See Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55,
74–81 (2012) (concluding that a CBA showing only modest net benefits from a strengthened
ozone standard likely contributed to OIRA opposition and Obama administration
abandonment of the proposed standard); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis
Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364–71 (2006) (showing that OIRA almost never

80

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

not aim to capture every nuance or even the prevailing pattern of agency practice. It
seeks to identify the aspirations found in positive law—the value choices top-level
policy makers, like legislatures, courts, and Presidents, have embedded in the law
that they create.
Indeed, by way of a caveat, if we lower our gaze from the law’s positive ideals
to actual administrative practice we will paint a very different and much more
muddled picture than this Article presents. For example, one might object to this
Article’s articulation of the feasibility principle on the ground that agencies in
practice use technology-based rulemaking to enact a political compromise based on
some unarticulated judgment about what advances the ball but is not too costly. And
one may object to the description of health-based standards on the ground that
agencies do not seriously seek to fully protect public health and the environment,
but rather to make incremental progress based on what they imagine would be
sensible, considering a variety of technical and political variables.121 Although a
thorough description of what administrative entities actually do might be of interest
for a variety of reasons, it does little to clarify the law’s fundamental normative and
analytical commitments because agency decisions often reflect a muddled response
to a range of political, legal, and technical considerations. 122 The fundamental
commitments found in statutes, court decisions, and executive orders provide the
basis for a positive theory of law, which identifies its aspirations, even if the practice
does not live up to any particular ideal. These commitments also provide an
important basis for debating fundamental legal reforms and for critiquing agency
practice.123
One might object to my exclusion of agency decisions as a source of positive
law on CBA’s goal on the ground that agency decision making does create law. The
law agencies create, however, does not articulate goals; it establishes requirements
that appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The preambles that appear in a
Federal Register notice could in theory announce some principles for application of

advocates more stringent rules and seeks to weaken rules even when CBA does not show
that they are too costly).
121
See, e.g., John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk,
A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 302 (1998) (finding that
EPA ignores risks arising from use of remedial technology under CERLA, even though the
statute specifically requires it to take them into account); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
(NRDC) v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that the EPA has substituted
a feasibility finding for a finding of what level of emission protects public health under an
effects-based provision).
122
See, e.g., McCubbin, supra note 57, at 23 (describing EPA’s BAT setting in practice
as “a value-laden political judgment to be made by EPA policymakers”).
123
See, e.g., NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1163 (reversing EPA’s decision to base regulation of
a hazardous air pollutant on feasibility when the statute requires it to protect public health).
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CBA. But Federal Register notices only do so rarely if at all.124 Moreover, preambles
in the federal register do not themselves establish law binding any private party or
agency, even though courts use them to help evaluate the legality of an agency’s
decisions and to interpret the rules themselves.125
The law does not articulate the criterion underlying CBA as clearly as the
criteria underlying effects-based and technology-based standard setting. But the
principle of avoiding disproportionate costs appears congruent with the little law we
have on this.
D. Insights and Research Questions Respecting Goals
This part cashes out the promise that considering environmental law’s goals
together yields some fruit. It first shows how these criteria illuminate entire statutes
and even the corpus of environmental law as a whole. It then reviews some of the
insights the juxtaposition of competing goals reveals and identifies research
questions, including normative questions that arise from an understanding of these
goals’ role in environmental law.
1. Goals and Environmental Law’s Structure
Although environmental statutes combine goal-setting provisions in various
ways, a structural analysis reveals some patterns that suggest more coherence than
seems evident from just listing three competing types of goals. First of all, the major
media-specific laws—the CAA, CWA, and RCRA—embrace an overarching goal
of protecting the environment and public health, not a goal of achieving some sort
of balance between environmental protection and other values. Yet, many of the
statutory provisions governing regulation of particular groups of polluting facilities
embrace the feasibility principle. Provisions maximizing feasible reductions usually
serve as a step toward meeting the goal of fully protecting people from serious health
and environmental effects.126 Thus, for example, the CWA directs EPA to impose
an array of technology-based standards on major pollution sources, culminating in
124

Cf. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,594
(July 9, 2004) (providing for site-specific technological adjustments when the otherwise
required technology generates costs “significantly greater than the benefits”).
125
Compare Wyeth v. Levin, 555 U.S. 555, 623 (2009) (holding that an agency
regulation, but not its statements in the preamble, have the force of law), with Se. Alaska
Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 649 (9th Cir. 2007)
(using contemporaneous explanations of regulations to interpret them), rev’d and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261 (2009), and New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (using preamble
statements to inform judgment about whether EPA’s rule was a reasonable interpretation of
the Clean Air Act).
126
Cf. McGarity, supra note 21, at 545 (describing Congress as demanding that EPA
achieve different goals simultaneously).
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the BAT provision that conforms to the feasibility principle. 127 But it further
contemplates state programs to generate additional reductions if needed to meet state
water quality standards. Similarly, the CAA requires federal technology-based
standards for new stationary sources and vehicles along with state technology-based
standards for major existing stationary sources of the pollutants governed by the
NAAQS. 128 But states must supplement these standards with additional rules if
needed to meet the effects-based NAAQS.129
The Courts gave cost-benefit considerations primacy in statutes, namely
FIFRA and TSCA, that contemplate bans of substances that we manufacture in order
to provide benefits to consumers or producers.130 These statutes do not only aim to
simply control unsought pollution byproducts of productive processes, as the mediaspecific statutes with overarching environmental effects-based goals do.131 Instead,
they authorize outlawing some productive processes outright. 132 Thus, bringing
together core understandings of goal setting in environmental law with a basic
inquiry into how the law combines these goals reveals a lot about environmental
law’s normative structure.
2. Insights and Research Questions with Respect to Normative Values
The pattern described above gives rise to an important question: What is the
best possible normative justification for this pattern? Without trying to answer this
question (which merits an entire article), it will help to review the state of existing
scholarship on the normative value of various environmental goals, which provides
the building blocks for addressing this question. This analysis suggests that although
we have some theory explaining the normative commitments in our environmental
statutes, we have some big gaps on very fundamental questions about the goals
creating the normative structure identified above. These gaps may reflect the lack of
a reasonably comprehensive positive theory, which may, in turn, stem from a
tendency within the field to focus on technocratic questions about analytical
technique and contemporary issues arising under individual statutes.

127

See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 1980)
(describing the sequence of best practicable control technology to BAT regulation for fish
processing plants).
128
See 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7411, 7502(c)(1), 7521 (West 2016).
129
42 U.S.C.A § 7410 (West 2016).
130
See McGarity, supra note 21, at 537 (describing TSCA and FIFRA as “licensing
statutes” because they authorize bans of chemicals).
131
See Angelo, supra note 67, at 183 (suggesting that a technology-based approach
may not work when the intended use of a product causes the risk prompting regulatory
consideration).
132
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A § 2605(2)(A) (West 2016).
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(a) Protecting Public Health and the Environment
We have very little work attempting to justify giving primacy to health or
environmental considerations through effects-based goals. Indeed, some scholars
find these goals either undesirable or unrealistic.133 Some CBA advocates, however,
have suggested that a justification may exist for treating protection of endangered
species or the avoidance of human premature death as special cases not amenable to
standard cost-benefit balancing. 134 Those suggestions invite the question of what
exactly justifies those conclusions. One might also ask whether the rationales for
accepting a rights-based approach to protecting some limited environmental impacts
might properly extend to other impacts—such as serious illness or destruction of
unique ecosystems—or even to environmental protection as a whole.
Amy Sinden has articulated a political economy justification for effects-based
standards. In her article, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power
in Environmental Law,135 she argues that the power of industry to influence standard
setting justifies cost-blind effects-based environmental law.136 In her account, this
power sufficiently tempers environmental law even when statutes do not authorize
consideration of cost.137 Keeping cost out of the formal equation serves to put a
thumb on the balance beam in favor of environmental protection, which will likely
produce a more appropriate balance than would be obtained if cost were explicitly
considered and then industry applied its lobbying muscle to exaggerate costs and use
arguments about cost to inappropriately weaken standards.138
A related political economy justification for effects-based standards involves
the role of technology-forcing in environmental law. In explaining the absolutism of
the CAA’s overall goals, the Supreme Court famously stated that Congress intended
133

See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233, 233–34 (1990) (characterizing mandates to protect public health as impractical and
unrealistic symbolic legislation).
134
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1697
(2001) (suggesting that the Endangered Species Act may be based on a “theory of rights,”
which may make CBA inappropriate); cf. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A
Comment on Judge Williams’ Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 272
(2001) (noting that “death is different” and therefore poses a challenge for CBA), Mark
Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More
than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 116–21 (2001) (acknowledging a principle that treats
“safety as more important than money” but arguing that it can be reconciled with CBA if
safety considerations are given added weight).
135
90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005).
136
See id. at 1411–12 (justifying the ESA and NAAQS as correctives to power
imbalances).
137
See id. at 1411 (portraying the prohibition on considering costs in the ESA as leading
to politically negotiated outcomes that are “less protective of species than a literal reading of
the ESA’s standards might dictate”).
138
See id. (claiming that the ESA places “a thumb on the scale in favor of the weaker
party” leading to outcomes “consistent with widely shared public values”).
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to get industry to do what appears infeasible.139 This statement could be read as
combining technological optimism with a wariness of what industry would do to a
statute if cost and technical feasibility were embedded in the statutes’ overall goals.
Thus, one might justify effects-based standards’ cost blindness pragmatically as an
attempt to avoid undue industry influence and to realize improvements based on
faith that industry will prove sufficiently innovative and capable to meet ambitious
technology-forcing goals without serious negative economic consequences for
society. Courts often cite this apparent infeasibility statement as evidence that the
CAA is a technology-forcing statute.140 In any case, technology forcing provides a
potential political economy justification for effects-based standards.
Technology-forcing’s role in potentially justifying effects-based standards
raises a conceptual question about where technology forcing fits in a framework that
contrasts technology-based standards with effects-based standards. We should
consider a technology-forcing goal as a type of technology-based goal. A number of
statutory provisions authorize EPA to develop standards based on the capabilities of
technologies not yet fully developed.141 These provisions, however, require EPA to
evaluate future technologies and do not authorize it to demand levels of pollution
that are impossible to achieve with any imaginable technology, even if such levels
might be needed to protect public health.142 They do not contemplate consideration
of what levels of pollution we might tolerate without significant negative effects. On
the other hand, the possibility of technological innovation in response to healthbased standards, as suggested already, can provide a pragmatic justification for
ignoring costs in order to protect public health. That is, we might feel more
comfortable in setting standards that protect public health—standards promulgated
without evaluation of technologies—because we expect that industry can innovate
to continue to produce what we would like to have even if we demand full health
139

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (describing the requirements to
meet the NAAQS as “technology-forcing” because “they are designed to force regulated
sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically
or technologically infeasible”).
140
See, e.g., Nat’l Steel Corp., Great Lakes Steel Div. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314, 325
(6th Cir. 1983) (citing this statement to justify the conclusion that CAA requirements have a
“technology-forcing character”).
141
See, e.g., Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(characterizing CAA section 213(a)(3) as a “technology-forcing” provision).
142
This statement assumes a somewhat narrow view of technology. If we view shutting
down plants as a technology, then a zero level is always achievable. See Union Elec., 427
U.S. at 265 n.14 (noting that in a literal sense all pollution control plans are feasible, since
plants can always comply by shutting down). But that is not what technology-based statutory
provisions envision. See, e.g., Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130,
1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (framing the issue in reviewing a technology-forcing regulation in
terms of whether EPA had a reasonable basis for “predicting future success” in development
of a technology); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 327–328 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(basing conclusions about technological feasibility on predictions about the development of
a known pollution control technology that could be employed in vehicles).
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and environmental protection. 143 Thus, technological innovation as a possibility
helps justify the concept of effects-based standards, but an estimate of an identified
technology’s potential in a given case justifies particular pollution control decisions
in the context of some technology-based standard setting exercises.144
The arguments that cost-blindness’ value in overcoming industry resistance
and taking advantage of unforeseeable technological advancements might provide
pragmatic justifications for effects-based standards, but they duck a more
fundamental normative question: Does a philosophical normative justification
implicit in our law for giving health and environmental considerations primacy
exist?
The structural insights offered, however, suggest that the primacy question
might be more narrowly framed. Is there some justification for effects-based
standards for media-specific statutes that does not fully extend to statutes that may
prohibit the use of particular toxic chemicals altogether?
(b) Maximizing Feasible Reductions
Most scholars endorse technology-based standards as pragmatic because of the
relative simplicity of the analysis required to set the standards and because they do
take costs into account in a workable way. 145 My previous work, however,
articulates a normative justification for the feasibility principle—defending its
approach to the distribution of cost as a reasonable way of addressing the centrality
of health and employment to people’s lives, while rejecting the notion that more
widely distributed cost typically matters enough to merit significant attention. 146
This work defends the centrality of health and employment by employing Martha
Nussbaum and Armataya Sen’s capabilities’ approach, which focuses on the
importance of maintaining people’s full capabilities to engage fruitfully in life.147 It
responds to the equation of cost with wealth reduction even when plants do not close
by pointing to the emerging literature on happiness to raise doubts about wealth’s
relationship to human flourishing.148 These justifications for the feasibility principle
merit more debate and might be usefully considered in light of technology-based

143

See generally Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 265 (affirming that states may attain the
NAAQS ahead of schedule if they are willing to force technology to bring this result about).
144
Cf. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 15, at 1257 (noting that technology-forcing
cannot justify a particular health-based standard because EPA may not consider
technological feasibility in making health-based decisions).
145
See, e.g., Babich, supra note 19, at 170–183; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 19, at
739–744; Wagner, supra note 19, at 88–107.
146
See Driesen, supra note 19, at 34–40.
147
See David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to
Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 321–326 (2011); cf. Masur & Posner,
supra note 19 (criticizing feasibility analysis).
148
See Driesen, supra note 147, at 325 (discussing the lack of correlation between
increased wealth and happiness).
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regulation’s role as a step toward full protection of public health and the environment
in many statutes.
(c) Restraining Disproportionately Costly Regulation
Surprisingly, nobody has articulated a normative justification for the principle
that costs should not grossly exceed benefits. A normative theory that adequately
addressed this question in light of a positive theory of environmental law’s means
and ends more generally would have to address the question of whether widely
dispersed costs should matter when the “benefits” involve avoiding such drastic
concentrated losses as death or serious illness. Thus, the positive theory identifies
new questions and arguments about cost-benefit balancing.
This lacuna in the scholarship appears surprising because a rich literature seeks
to justify CBA’s role in environmental law. This literature, however, focuses
overwhelmingly on claims that bypass fundamental normative questions, as Kysar
has pointed out.149 Thus, proponents have argued that CBA enhances rationality,150
facilitates political control of rulemaking,151 and serves democracy by counteracting
hysterical fears.152 I do not mean to dismiss the importance of these arguments by
highlighting their failure to address the fundamental normative question of why the
particular balance sought in environmental law constitutes a good goal.
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, however, have sought to establish a normative
foundation for CBA by developing a concept of overall well-being.153 The concept
of overall well-being has a lot in common with allocative efficiency, but it rejects a
complete reliance on consumer preferences as revealed in purchase decisions as the
basis for assessing costs and benefits.154 Traditionally, economic theory has treated
what people are willing to pay for goods and services (or willing to accept to part
149

See KYSAR, supra note 9, at x (arguing that “dominant ways of thinking about
environmental law . . . aspire to objectivity” and thereby mask fundamental questions about
our responsibilities).
150
See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH
12 (2008) (characterizing CBA as “a requirement of basic rationality”).
151
See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2001) (positing that CBA
facilitates political control by the President and Congress under some common conditions).
152
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685–91 (1999) (offering CBA as an antidote to “mass delusions”).
153
See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 6–8 (2006); see also MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 155–159 (2012) (further developing the
overall well-being concept).
154
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165, 177 (1999) (rejecting reliance on “unrestricted preferences” as “implausible
and unnecessary”).
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with goods and services they possess) as a measurement of goods and services’
value. 155 Environmental CBA seeks, through various techniques, to apply this
concept to the public goods that environmental protection provides—such as
protection of health and ecosystems.156 Adler and Posner, however, recognize that
sometimes people do not know what is good for them. 157 It would be odd, for
example, to treat the high price paid for heroin as a measure of its great positive
value. So, they base overall well-being on a concept of measuring people’s “desires”
in ways that “launder” preferences, i.e., to clean out perverse preferences.158 This
brief summary cannot do full justice to their work, but it suffices to ground further
discussion of how a positive theory might inform future work on cost-benefit
balancing’s normative foundations. Although intended as a normative theory, it
offers a plausible positive theory as well, which might explain the actual normative
basis for current law on cost-benefit balancing.159
Still, Adler and Posner’s concept of overall well-being, whatever its value for
normative theory, establishes such a general goal that its utility for positive
theory¾justifying a specific norm guiding CBA’s use¾ becomes hard to see. To
be a little more precise, their theory does not foreclose the possibility that overall
well-being requires the preservation of human life at any cost.160 Their theory is
capacious enough to accept a health-based criterion for a pollutant killing people or
to instead demand some sort of unspecified tradeoff between the benefit of
preserving life and the cost of doing so.161 In spite of this problem, future work might
consider whether the concept of overall well-being, or some new variant of it,
supports the criterion found in the law of CBA, the idea that costs should not greatly
outweigh benefits. I suspect that Adler and Posner would say it does, but it is hard
to see why that would always be true in light of Adler’s recognition that preservation
of life poses challenges for CBA, as many people will not be willing to accept a
payment (at any price) to allow polluters to kill them.162
155

See id. at 220.
See Sinden, supra note 6, at 105–107 (discussing various methods of valuing
environmental benefits based on individual preferences).
157
See Adler & Posner, supra note 154, at 203–04 (discussing ways in which a person’s
preferences may not advance well-being).
158
See id. at 246 (claiming that CBA may have to be adjusted to reflect distorted
preferences).
159
See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 327 (2000) (arguing that regulatory agencies
generally deviate from the unrestricted preference-based view of welfare).
160
See Adler, supra note 134, at 272 (explaining why the rational for CBA may break
down for actions involving death).
161
See Driesen, supra note 19, at 70–71 (explaining why the overall well-being does
not rule out giving primacy to avoiding death and destruction of species).
162
See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 590 (1997) (noting that many
people might not be willing to accept a payment to give up a right to be free from pollution
156
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So, in spite of the reams of ink spilled over CBA, we still have work to do on
providing a normative justification for a goal that costs should not greatly outweigh
benefits. Part of the problem stems from the regulatory reform literature’s tendency
to focus on the analytical technique of CBA, rather than a specific cost-benefit
criterion. Indeed, CBA scholars often fail to specify what criterion they have in mind
or embrace several different criteria at once. 163 This makes normative debate
difficult.
3. On the Relationship Between Norms and Analysis
The positive theory developed here has a structure that suggests a fundamental
problem with focusing normative theory on an analytical technique. The theory
developed here focuses normative explanation on statutory goals and the criteria
governing standard setting—the goals of environmental law—not on the analytical
technique employed to craft standards designed to achieve those goals. It treats the
analytical techniques as an implication of the goal choice. Thus, for example, if one
believes that ethics and morality require that public health and environmental
protection have absolute priority, then one should not consider costs in crafting
environmental standards, and therefore CBA becomes an inappropriate technique.
Similarly, if one thinks that health and environmental benefits should have primacy
except when the costs of that primacy have devastating effects on employment, then
feasibility analysis, not CBA, makes sense. On the other hand, if one embraces the
proposition that costs should not greatly outweigh benefits, even when the benefits
accrue to public health or the environment, then some sort of comparison between
costs and benefits becomes an essential technique.
This approach to the relationship between goals and analytical technique
comports with common sense and central tenets of administrative law.
Administrators must make a lot of decisions, and they should choose a form of
analysis that fits the particular decision they have to make without wasting resources
generating a lot of irrelevant analysis, while carefully considering all information
made relevant by the statutory mandates they operate under. The statutory criteria
found in environmental statutes represent elected representatives’ decisions about
the goals of environmental law. The legislature implements its normative values, in
part, by specifying the factors agencies should consider in making decisions. For
that reason, consideration of factors not included in germane statutory provisions, or
neglect of factors included, constitutes arbitrary and capricious rulemaking. 164
threatening their health); cf. ADLER, supra note 134, at 272 (recognizing that the price a
person might be willing to accept for her own death might be infinite).
163
See Driesen, supra note 120, at 341–42, 387–94 (discussing CBA proponents’
“indeterminate position” that says nothing about criteria and several criteria sometimes
advocated).
164
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (forbidding consideration of factors Congress had not intended the agency to
consider); cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that cost is a relevant
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Agencies must confine their analysis to the factors made relevant in governing law
to remain faithful to the goals elected officials have chosen when they delegated
authority to make these sorts of decisions.165
Debates about analytical technique, however, remain important on pragmatic
grounds. Daniel Farber, Robert Glicksman, and Sidney Shapiro have developed
theories of eco-pragmatism, which link environmental law to the philosophical
tradition of American pragmatism.166 They tend to like technology-based regulation,
partly because feasibility analysis proves much simpler than competing forms of
analysis. 167 In evaluating this preference, however, it remains useful to consider
norms and analytical technique separately. If one finds the norms underlying
technology-based regulation attractive, then the advantage of relatively simple
analytical technique seals the deal. But those, like Eric Posner and Jonathan Masur,
who find the feasibility principle unattractive, may find the complexity of CBA
worth putting up with in order to arrive at a better normative place (in their view).168
My main point is that the tendency of us technocratic lawyers to focus on analytical
technique may obscure normative questions. On the other hand, those most
dedicated to particular norms still need to see that questions of analytical technique
matter to how law functions in practice and should not too readily assume that law
can cope with infinite analytical complexity.
4. On Precaution
Kysar’s book, Regulating from Nowhere, focuses heavily on a defense of the
precautionary principle, which Cass Sunstein and others have heavily criticized.169
This Article will not join the debate about the precautionary principle’s value. But it
will prove useful to situate the precautionary principle in this discussion of

factor that EPA must consider in deciding whether regulation of power plant mercury
emissions is “necessary and appropriate”).
165
Cf. RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 159–90 (constructing a model where an
individual is free to refine her view of her own ends to resolve conflicts among them in
particular cases).
166
See DANIEL FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 10 (1999); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 49–53
(2003).
167
See FARBER, supra note 166, at 9–14; SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 166, at
46–72.
168
See Masur & Posner, supra note 19, at 699–712 (explaining in detail why they
dislike the feasibility principle and suggesting that cost-benefit balancing is better).
169
KYSAR, supra note 9, at 19 (characterizing the precautionary principle as “well
suited to safeguarding life and the environmental under conditions of uncertainty and
ignorance”); see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 31 (2007); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2003).
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environmental law’s goals, as it constitutes an important piece of the fragmented
positive theory puzzle.170
The precautionary principle rejects postponing cost effective action on
significant environmental problems based on scientific uncertainty. 171 Its critics
have castigated it for not usefully guiding standard setting decisions. 172 In other
words, they fault it for not stating a specific goal. The theory developed here
describes the principles that guide goal setting and imply a question about where the
precautionary principle fits within this framework.
The primary use of the precautionary principle does not implicate goals. The
courts and commentators have emphasized the precautionary principle’s role as a
trigger.173 That is, before one can decide what sorts of standards to set for particular
pollutants, one must decide which pollutants pose a sufficient danger to merit any
regulatory attention at all. The precautionary principle helps guide this decision,
permitting policy-makers to list pollutants for regulatory decisions before we have
complete knowledge about their effects.174 A prominent example comes from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 175 which required EPA to
determine whether greenhouse gases endanger public health or the environment
under a precautionary approach.176 Once EPA did determine that greenhouse gases
pose a serious risk, it had to regulate them, but did so primarily under statutory
provisions that do not call for reconsidering the risks involved, but instead, demand
rules mandating technologically feasible emission reductions.177
170

See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 9, at 12 (describing the precautionary principle as “one
aspect of a much more elaborate regulatory process”); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a
Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,790 (2001).
171
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex
1, Princ. 15 (August 22, 1992). Although this constitutes a leading and oft-reiterated
statement of the precautionary principle, statements of the principle vary. See 20TH CENTURY
PRECAUTION, supra note 20, at 6; James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. J. ENVTL. L. 423, 432–
36 (1995) (collecting statements of the principle in international legal instruments).
172
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 131; Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political
Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 333 (2002);
Stone, supra note 170, at 10,799.
173
See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (defining
the issue as whether EPA may regulate lead based on a finding of a significant risk of harm).
174
See id. at 9, 13 (characterizing the statutory endangerment trigger as precautionary
and explaining the lack of certainty about leaded gasoline’s effects).
175
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
176
Id. at 532–34 (rejecting a host of policy arguments against regulating greenhouse
gases and directing EPA to simply determine whether these gases endanger public health or
the environment).
177
See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,851 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R pt. 60) (proposing a power plant rule for existing sources under the technology-
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Yet, most scholars accept a role for precaution in standard setting as well,
implying that it has some relevance to setting goals.178 Its most obvious application
takes place when regulators establish effects-based standards. The precautionary
principle implies a conservative approach to risk assessment in setting standards
designed to protect the environment or public health.179
Scholars also sometimes identify technology-based standards as
precautionary.180 They may simply mean that technology-based standards do not
conflict with precaution, as they do not use scientific uncertainty as a basis for
postponing cost effective measures. The theory sketched above, though, suggests
that precaution does not provide much guidance to agencies setting technologybased standards because science about environmental effects should not influence
these standards. Therefore, a cautious attitude toward risk assessment is not relevant
to technology-based standard setting. Rather, the relevant question becomes what
can we achieve with feasible technological improvements. One might ask whether
precaution can play a role in justifying technology-based criteria as a goal choice
even if it should play no role in crafting standards under technology-based
provisions.
The conventional wisdom holds that cost-benefit balancing conflicts with
precaution. But the framework sketched above calls that wisdom into doubt.181 For
the framework identifies risk assessment as common to both effects-based and costbenefit-based standard setting. If regulators establishing cost-benefit based
standards adopt a precautionary approach to the risk assessment underlying CBA
and toward the treatment of unquantified benefits, then they presumably have
conformed to the precautionary principle. For the precautionary principle seems to
based section 111 of the CAA); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1443–
44 (Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 60, 71–72, 98) (proposing a power plant
rule for new sources under the technology-based section 111 of the CAA); Proposed
Rulemaking to Establish Light-duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,461 (Sept. 28, 2009)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600) (summarizing technology-based statutory provisions
providing the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks); see
generally Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114, 116–126 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (upholding EPA’s finding that
greenhouse gases endanger public health and the environment).
178
See David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can
They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 789 (2013) (stating that many scholars
think that the precautionary principle has something to say about levels of standards).
179
See id. at 798.
180
See, e.g., Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK,
in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 224, 241 (Timothy O’Riordan & James
Cameron eds., 1994) (pointing out that the precautionary principle is often seen as
synonymous with basing regulation on technical feasibility).
181
See, e.g., APPLEGATE, supra note 20, at 171 (characterizing CBA as “an alternative”
to the precautionary principle); Stone, supra note 170, at 10796 (claiming that the
precautionary principle demands a curtailment of CBA once a harm threshold is reached).
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allow governments to reject pollution control standards on the ground that they cost
too much; it only eliminates scientific uncertainty as a basis for rejecting standards.
On the other hand, CBA that ignores important unquantified benefits or treats
uncertainty as a reason to devalue pollution control’s benefits would violate the
principle.
Cost-benefit balancing may conflict with a normative judgment about the
primacy society should give to protection of public health and the environment, and
a similar normative judgment may underlie the precautionary principle. But that
does not mean that CBA violates the precautionary principle itself. The normative
justification for the precautionary principle and for rejecting CBA must be closely
related to the justification for effects-based standards. For a decision to be
conservative about targeted health and environmental risks, rather than, say the
economic effects of spending money on pollution control, implies giving primacy to
public health and the environment. Thus, further work on justifying health and
effects-based standards would also contribute to a normative defense of the
precautionary principle.
5. A Brief Summary of Payoffs
Thus, we see that a precise systematic understanding of environmental goals
on a very basic level yields important insights into environmental law as a whole
and reveals a valuable research agenda. It helps reveal environmental law’s
underlying structure. It yields a series of questions about the normative justification
for the structure and its components. It also highlights some pragmatic
considerations about analytical technique and invites us to think more about the
relationship between pragmatism and normative philosophy. Finally, it helps us
understand the role of precaution in environmental law.
II. THE MEANS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Government agencies and regulated firms have a variety of tools at their
disposal to achieve environmental standards, i.e. to meet society’s goals for
environmental law. Much of the scholarship about instrument choice—government
choices about the regulatory means of environmental protection—has a goal of
promoting the use of economic incentives, especially emissions trading, rather than
of analyzing or explaining existing law.182 This Article uses the term “emissions
182

See Sanja Bogojević, Ending the Honeymoon: Deconstructing Emissions Trading
Discources, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 443, 447 (2009) (describing the emissions trading literature as
having a “promotional” rather than an analytic nature). The rationale for referring to an
emissions trading program as an economic incentive program is not entirely clear either. See
David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Beyond the
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 289
(1998) [hereinafter Emissions Trading]. Trading proponents tend to think of it these days as
putting a price on pollution. See David M. Driesen, Putting a Price on Carbon: The
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trading” in a broad sense to include any program that allows for trading of
environmental benefits, a usage consistent with that found in the promotional
literature on instrument choice. This promotional scholarship has proven quite
successful, so that now any discussion of positive law must include emissions
trading, as it plays an important, increasing role in environmental protection.183 This
scholarship, however, has sometimes demonized other means of meeting
environmental goals, lumping many of them together with technology-based goal
setting under the very imprecise rubric of “command-and-control” regulation. 184
This approach may have been useful when emissions trading struggled to achieve a
place in environmental law and policy. But at this juncture, a positive theory of the
means of environmental protection would add much needed clarity to the debate
about instrument choice, greatly contribute to an emerging third generation debate
on instrument design, and prompt a new discussion of the relationship between
means and ends.
This part begins with a treatment of traditional regulation—performance
standards, work practice standards, and phaseouts. It then continues with a
discussion of emissions trading and pollution taxes.
This account focuses solely on legal means that regulators use to achieve
particular environmental goals, such as the goals elaborated above, thereby
facilitating a discussion of the relationship of means to ends in part three. This
narrow approach makes the topic of means and ends manageable and facilitates
concise and coherent analysis of the relationship between them. Yet it leaves out
other aspects of environmental law that can be thought of as means of environmental
protection. Specifically, it leaves out legal mechanisms that encourage
environmental improvements without aiming at specific goals, namely
informational approaches and liability. It also does not specifically focus on
Metaphor, 44 ENVTL. L. 695, 696 (2014) (discussing the recent rhetorical shift that treats
emissions trading to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as “putting a price on carbon”). But a
traditional regulation does that as well. See Todd Gerarden, Richard G. Newell, & Robert N.
Stavins, Deconstructing the Energy-Efficiency Gap: Conceptual Frameworks and Evidence,
105 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROC. 183, 184 (2015) (noting that regulation directly or
indirectly prices environmental externalities).
183
See David M. Driesen, Alternatives to Regulation? Market Mechanisms and the
Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 203, 209–215 (Robert Baldwin,
Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge eds., 2010) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK] (describing the
increased use of trading over time).
184
See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1334–39 (treating “serious
inefficiency of . . . command-and-control regulation” as evidence that a strategy of requiring
installation of available technology wastes money); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano,
Emissions Trading: Why Is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 220
(1988) (equating “command-and-control” with “technology forcing”); see also Andrew
McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1336 (1996) (characterizing
“free market advocates” as offering only two, diametrically opposed options: “command and
control” regulation and a “market-dominated system”).
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technological approaches that polluters can use to protect the environment, namely
end-of-the-pipe controls, pollution prevention, and recycling. Much work remains
to be done on specifying the relationships among these three types of means. But a
focus on legal means of meeting specified goals facilitates development of a concise
theory of means and ends.
A. Traditional Regulation
1. Performance Standards
The media-specific statutes rely heavily on performance standards as a major
means of environmental protection. Performance standards, as the name implies,
demand a particular level of environmental performance. For example, air pollution
standards for electric utilities typically limit the pounds of a pollutant per British
Thermal Unit (BTU) of energy produced.185 Thus, performance standards do not
dictate a technological approach. Formally, at least, they leave polluters free to
choose whatever technology they wish to employ, as long as their facility or product
reaches the required pollution control level. Because performance standards offer
plant operators some flexibility, the pollution control statutes usually require their
use when pollution levels can be monitored to allow for practical enforcement of a
performance standard.186
2. Work Practice Standards
Sometimes, however, agencies promulgate standards that tell polluters how to
reduce pollution, instead of mandating that they achieve a particular level of
pollution reduction.187 Let us call these standards work practice standards.188 The
statutes authorize work practice standards when designing or enforcing a

185

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.43Da (West 2016).
See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (EPA may
not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline, because the Clean Air Act mandates
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981)
(authority to set performance standards does not include authority to specify fuels).
187
See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 277, 294–95 (1978),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (majority and dissenting opinions) (discussing a
regulation that requires watering down asbestos during building demolition but does not
specify an emissions limit).
188
An illustrative statutory provision authorizes promulgation of “design, equipment,
work practice, or operational standards.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h) (2016 West). I use
the term “work practice standard” generically to refer to all of these sorts of prescriptive
standards.
186
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performance standard appears infeasible.189 It is usually not possible to enforce an
emissions standard when it is impossible to measure the level of pollution.190
3. Phaseouts
Although rarely employed, environmental statutes do authorize and sometimes
require phaseouts of hazardous substances. For example, we phased out lead from
gasoline, many ozone depleting chemicals, and DDT.191 A phaseout resembles, at
first glance, a very strict performance standard, requiring a zero level of pollution.
But a performance standard set at zero only eliminates pollution in a single medium.
A phaseout of a chemical, by contrast, eliminates pollution caused by the production
and use of the phased-out substance in all media—land, air, and water.
B. Emissions Trading and Pollution Taxes
Although used sparingly in the United States, economists have long
recommended pollution taxes as a means of pollution control. Faced with a tax on
pollution, polluters would presumably pay for pollution control if doing so is
cheaper than paying the tax. As a result, a tax provides a cost effective means of
reducing emissions. Those with only expensive pollution abatement opportunities
would presumably pay the tax instead of reducing emissions. Those with relatively
inexpensive available pollution abatement possibilities would abate emissions to
avoid (or reduce) the tax. Other countries have used pollution taxes and the United
States has made some limited use of fees and taxes that bear some relationship to
pollution.192
The United States has made extensive use of another technique for cost
effective pollution reductions—emissions trading. 193 Emissions trading builds on
the idea of a performance standard, which establishes a quantitative reduction
obligation. A regulator creating a trading program establishes quantitative limits on
emissions for regulated pollution sources, but makes the reduction obligations
tradable. Under such an approach a polluter with an obligation to reduce emissions
189

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h)(1) (West 2016); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. §6924(m)(1) (West
2016) (authorizing the EPA to create treatment standards for the disposal of solid waste).
190
See 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h)(2) (West 2016); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824
F.2d 1146, 1157 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the provision authorizing work practice
standards for hazardous air pollutants does so only when emissions cannot be measured);
e.g., Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 286–87, 298 (majority and dissenting opinion) (noting
that EPA chose a work practice standard because EPA could not regulate emissions since the
emissions could not be measured).
191
42 U.S.C.A §§ 7545(n), 7671c-7671e (West 2016); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming the DDT ban).
192
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 183, at 209 (discussing the use of pollution taxes
primarily in Europe).
193
See id. at 210–11 (discussing trading’s growing influence in the US).
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can avoid this obligation if she pays somebody else to make extra reductions in her
stead. 194 Given this flexibility, some polluters with relatively cheap abatement
opportunities will likely provide more reductions than required in order to sell
credits for the extra reductions to polluters needing credits.195 Conversely, polluters
facing expensive local abatement costs will likely purchase credits from overcomplying polluters in lieu of local abatement.196 Thus, trading generally facilitates
cost effective abatement, by permitting reallocation of reduction obligations to those
with the cheapest pollution abatement opportunities.
C. Insights
The juxtaposition of the various regulatory means of pollution control aimed at
specific goals yields some useful insights that help clarify understanding of
instrument choice and design. First of all, the juxtaposition of performance standards
and work practice standards highlights the importance of monitoring in instrument
choice. Simply put, a performance standard offers desirable technological flexibility,
but does not work as a practical matter when we cannot monitor pollution levels.
Accordingly, the statutes usually favor performance standards but contemplate
substituting work practice standards when performance standards appear infeasible.
Since emissions trading constitutes a variant on a performance standard, it
follows that emissions trading cannot work properly when we cannot reliably
monitor emissions. Most emissions trading proponents recognize that measurement
of emissions proves critical to the enforcement of an emissions trading program and
therefore do not recommend trading absent reliable monitoring.197 Yet this insight
has received insufficient attention, as it implies that a standard recommendation that
regulators should make emissions trading “comprehensive” needs qualification.198
194

See Emissions Trading, supra note 182, at 290 (“Emissions trading programs allow
polluters to avoid pollution reductions at a regulated pollution source, if they provide an
equivalent reduction elsewhere.”).
195
See id. at 334 (explaining that emissions trading encourages those with low marginal
pollution abatement cost to go beyond compliance).
196
Id. (explaining how those with high marginal control cost may forego local
abatement and buy credits instead).
197
See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Fort & Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond
a National Program?: Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 463, 467 (1997) (arguing that trading only works with accurate monitoring);
Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for
Pollution Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 212 (1998) (characterizing thorough
monitoring as an essential element of a trading program).
198
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach
to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83,
103–108 (1992) (advocating comprehensive trading of greenhouse gases in spite of
monitoring challenges). Stewart and Wiener argue that “monitoring will be required in order
to secure compliance with any agreed-on limitations” even without trading. Id. at 108. This
overlooks several points. First, allowing trading in poorly monitored pollutants can
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When an environmental problem arises in part from pollutants that cannot be reliably
monitored, emissions trading schemes probably should focus on those pollutants that
can be, rather than regulating comprehensively but poorly. Considering all of these
mechanisms together yields some additional insights along these same lines.
The observation that trading depends on adequate monitoring invites an inquiry
into whether other mechanisms depend on adequate monitoring as well. Pollution
taxes, upon reflection, also depend on adequate monitoring and therefore may prove
inappropriate where adequate monitoring is not possible.199 If tax authorities cannot
determine how much pollution is being emitted, they cannot determine the correct
amount of tax to collect.
By contrast, a phaseout can function even when pollution cannot be measured.
A phaseout usually limits the production of a particular substance and one can verify
compliance with a phaseout without measuring the pollution emitted in a particular
medium. One need only measure production levels or purchase records to see
whether a manufacturer has complied with a phaseout requirement.
This recognition of a phaseout’s ability to function when polluters and
inspectors cannot monitor pollution levels reveals a potential way around the
technical limits monitoring weaknesses can place on effective emissions trading
programs and pollution taxes. Even when regulators cannot measure emissions, they
can tax or limit production of products causing emissions, and we did this when we
phased out lead and ozone-depleting chemicals. Production limits can also be made
tradable. Amy Sinden and I have analyzed the potential of “dirty input limits”
(DILs), which limit the production of products rather than emissions, to work well
as an instrument of environmental protection, including tradable DILs.200
The possibility of phasing-out or limiting the production of products that cause
pollution might prove useful in addressing the largest environmental problem we
face, that of global climate disruption. Currently, many policies addressing climate
disruption focus on emission reductions. Some of these programs prove awkward to
design and implement, partly because of measurement difficulties.201 DILs might
prove useful in overcoming these limitations and in facilitating the eventual
phaseout of fossil fuels that scientists recommend.202
compound the effect of monitoring limitations, because exaggerated claims of emission
reductions can be strategically combined with minimization of debits to create greater losses
of planned emission reductions. Second, one can circumvent monitoring limitations with
dirty input limits or work practice standards and could plausibly write international
commitments in those terms as well.
199
See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes
for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 921–22 (characterizing “continuous
emissions monitoring” as “necessary” for accurate tax assessment).
200
See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 67 (2009) (describing and evaluating DILs).
201
See, e.g., id. at 80 (describing the problems in addressing transportation emissions
of greenhouse gases through emissions trading).
202
See id. at 104–09 (discussing the design and value of a fossil fuel DIL).
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This part deliberately leaves out many insights in the instrument choice
literature, including insights in my own articles on the subject. It simply shows that
a more precise account of the means of environmental protection provides some
insights into both limits of highly touted approaches and new possibilities meriting
more attention. A good understanding of the principle means of meeting specific
pollution control goals yields insights, just as an understanding of goals does. Putting
means and ends together reveals still more.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEANS AND ENDS
Understanding specific normative goals and regulatory means enables us to
better understand the relationship between means and ends. Analysts sometimes
confuse environmental law’s means with its ends in the discussion of technologybased regulation, sometimes called “command-and-control” regulation. As we shall
see, avoiding this conflation provides a clearer understanding of environmental law
as a whole and insights into a host of important issues.
This part begins by creating a framework for understanding the range of meansends relationships, which it derives primarily from a close analysis of the concept of
technology-based regulation. It then shows how this framework illuminates
establishment of goals for economic incentive programs (trading and then taxes) and
the problem of addressing risk/risk issues—where addressing one environmental
risk creates another.
A. Separating Means and Ends to Understand Technology-Based Regulation and
the Wide Variety of Potential Means-Ends Combinations
Some scholarship characterizes technology-based standards and “command
and control” regulations as standards that mandate the use of a particular
technology. 203 Some scholarship, however, characterizes technology-based
regulation as specifying pollutant levels or technologies.204 Although this variation
suggests some confusion, both of these descriptions treat technology-based
regulation as a means of environmental protection, not as a goal-setting mechanism.
203

KYSAR, supra note 9, at 5 (summarizing the case “against conventional
environmental health and safety regulation” as equating “command-and-control regulation”
with “mandating a single compliance technique . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted); see
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109–10 (1989) (stating that “command
and control regulations . . . specify methods and technologies [that] firms must use to control
pollution. . . .”); Sadowitz, supra note 17, at 18 (characterizing “[t]echnology-based
standards” as “mandat[ing] the use of a particular technology. . . .”).
204
See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5 (1991) (defining command
and control regulation to include commands to use particular pollution controls and
performance standards).
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Careful parsing of the language in key standard setting provisions supports the
conceptualization offered in part one, which treats technology-based regulation as
embracing a goal of realizing technologically feasible emission reductions. This
parsing also helps clarify the relationship between this goal and various means of
environmental protection.
Let us begin the parsing with the classic technology-based program¾the CWA
BAT program. The most pertinent BAT provision requires EPA to “identify . . . the
degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best control
measures and practices.”205 This provision does not leave EPA free to choose the
general policy goal guiding decisions about the “degree” of water pollution
reduction EPA may demand. It requires the amount of reduction in water pollution
“attainable through the application of the best control measures and practices.”206 In
other words, it demands that EPA, in setting effluent limitations assess the
capabilities of technology. This means that EPA must establish effluent limitations
that meet the goal of getting polluters to achieve the pollution reductions that the
best technologies can achieve, neither more nor less. This technology-based criterion
thereby establishes a goal for EPA standard setting.
The BAT example also shows that the identification of technology-based
standard setting with technological specification, i.e. with work practice standards,
is usually incorrect. The CWA’s BAT provisions require EPA to write “effluent
limitations.”207 The term effluent limitation implies a limit on the amount of effluent
discharged¾a kind of performance standard. The phrase “degree of effluent
reduction” refers to the amount of reduction in water pollution that will be
demanded.208 And a review of the Code of Federal Regulations shows that effluent
limitation guidelines, the actual requirements that polluters must meet, usually take
the form of a performance standard¾generally limiting the parts per million of a
pollutant allowed in water or the pounds of pollutant permitted per unit of
production.209
Some BAT limits, however, do take the form of a requirement to employ a
particular technology.210 But the fact that some BAT limits take the form of work
practice standards only cements the point that BAT limits sometimes specify
technologies, but usually do not. All BAT limits, however, reflect EPA’s assessment
of what the best technology can achieve and therefore serve the goal of maximizing
feasible emission reductions.
205

33 U.S.C.A §1314(b)(2)(A) (West 2016).
Id. (emphasis added).
207
See 33 U.S.C.A § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2016).
208
Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 286 (1978) (distinguishing
the establishment of level of reduction from the technologies used to attain this level).
209
See 40 C.F.R. Ch. I. Subch. N. pt. 400–71 (West 2016).
210
See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. E.P.A., 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that EPA requires the use of a dissolved air flotation unit to limit water pollution from fish
processing operations).
206
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The same basic structure governs every technology-based statutory provision
that I am aware of, even though the details of these provisions vary in a number of
respects.211 Thus, for example, the provision governing EPA’s recently promulgated
rules regulating power plants’ carbon dioxide emissions¾section 111 of the
CAA¾requires “emission limitation[s]” attainable with application of the “best”
demonstrated “system of emission reduction.”212 Like the BAT provisions, section
111 makes the capabilities of the best systems of emission reduction the measuring
rod for the degree of stringency required.
Furthermore, an emission limitation, like an effluent limitation, constitutes a
performance standard. A different subsection of section 111, however, authorizes
work practice standards when setting an emission limitation is impracticable. 213
Hence, even though these standards are technology-based in the sense that they
reflect an assessment of what level of reductions the best demonstrated emission
reduction system can achieve, they usually take the form of a performance standard,
not a work practice standard.214
Richard Stewart, however, has suggested that in practice technology-based
performance standards provide “strong incentives to adopt the . . . technology
underlying the [performance] standard” in spite of the formal structure that I have
identified. 215 The empirical literature shows that in some cases polluters have
adopted new technologies not anticipated by the agency in response to technologybased standards.216 At the same time, if EPA has in fact based a standard on the best

211

See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that EPA may not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline, because the CAA mandates
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the authority to set a performance standard does not include the authority to
specify fuels); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(1) (West 2016) (distinguishing between specifying
“levels” and treatment methods, but not expressing a policy preference for performance
standards).
212
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(1) (West 2016); cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (West 2016)
(defining new source standards under the CWA in very similar terms).
213
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(5), (h) (West 2016).
214
See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285–86 (distinguishing
between a quantitative “level” of emissions and the technological means employed to meet
the level); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1429, 1444 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71) (stating that EPA does not generally specify a
technology that must be used to comply with new source performance standards under CAA
section 111).
215
See Richard Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1268–69 (1981).
216
See Nicholas Ashford et al., Using Regulations to Change the Market for Innovation,
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 436–443 (1985) (discussing innovative responses to
technology-based and other types of regulation); U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT
OTA-ENV-635, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS OF
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and most cost effective technology, one would expect industry to use that technology
unless it can cheaply eliminate the pollutant involved or develop an adequate
alternative not known to EPA. But the basic point remains, as a formal matter
technology-based standards do not always, or even usually, directly require a
particular technology. Instead, a technology-based standard reflects a goal of
maximizing reductions realizable through use of feasible technologies and often
produces performance standards while sometimes producing work practice
standards.
Technology-based standards uniquely rely on technological capability to
identify degrees of pollution control—i.e., as a measuring rod for goal setting. Their
expression in the form of performance or work practice standards, however, does
not constitute a unique characteristic of technology-based regulation. Other goal
setting provisions also lead to establishment of performance or work practice
standards. For example, effects-based provisions that are not technology-based, but
instead focused on protecting public health, also generate work practice and
performance standards.
Section 112 of the pre-1990 CAA illustrates how effects-based goals generate
performance standards—or, occasionally, work practice standards—as means
toward ends that have little to do with technology. Before 1990, section 112 of that
Act authorized health-based standards for hazardous air pollutants¾not technologybased standards.217 Section 112, however, contained (and still contains) a provision
that exactly parallels the provision in section 111 authorizing work practice
standards while creating a presumption in favor of performance standards. 218 In
other words, when Congress adopted a health protection goal, rather than a
feasibility goal, it still recognized that EPA might mandate employment of specific
pollution control technologies and created the same policy about when to do so as
that found in many technology-based statutory provisions—a preference for
performance standards combined with authorization to dictate technologies when
enforcement of a performance standard proves impractical. Section 112 therefore
suggests that the policy issue of selecting the means of environmental protection
remains basically the same regardless of what principle establishes the goal for a
particular standard.
This analysis suggests that a wide variety of goal setting procedures can lead
to specification of a performance or work practice standard. The literature, however,
sometimes wrongly suggests that specification of a performance standard or
technology constitutes a unique attribute of technology-based rulemaking.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH¾AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL
APPROACH 64 (1995) (discussing innovation in response to OSHA standards).
217
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1146, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that EPA must establish emission standards for hazardous air pollutants that protect
public health with an “ample margin of safety”).
218
See Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 286 (discussing the provision of the 1977
Amendments authorizing work practice standards when “it is not feasible” to establish or
enforce an “emission[s] standard”).
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Separating means and ends rather than conflating them yields the insight that a
wide combination of means and ends can exist, even when confining the analysis to
means of achieving precisely specified regulatory goals. The chart below illustrates
the full range of potential combinations suggested by the analysis provided in parts
one and two:
ENDS
MEANS
Work Practice
Performance
Emissions Trading
Taxes

Effects-based
X
X
X
X

TechnologyBased
X
X
X
X

Cost-Benefit
Based
X
X
X
X

B. Understanding the Problem of Goal Setting for Emissions Trading Programs
and the Future of Climate Disruption Policy
Like performance and work practice standards, an emissions trading program
can provide a means of environmental protection serving a variety of goals.219 This
point proves significant because it runs counter to the impression that the instrument
choice literature creates and it yields very important insights and questions about the
design of emissions trading programs. Since policies throughout the world have
placed emissions trading at the heart of their efforts to address global climate
disruption, insights into trading design matter a great deal.
In order to establish an emissions trading program, one must set a goal for the
program. This goal determines how many allowances the regulator distributes to
polluters.220 The conventional way of thinking about establishing a goal for pollution
trading involves reliance on CBA to determine an optimal level of pollution. I know
of no case in which a government has based a trading program on an estimation of
optimal pollution levels. 221 But we do have examples of effects-based and
technology-based trading goals.222 Generally, tradable fishing quota programs aim
to establish a limit for the overall catch that prevents depletion of the fishery¾an
effects-based standard. 223 Trading programs aimed at limiting pollution have

219

See David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon, 40 ENVTL. L. 1, 20–27 (2010) (describing
various cap setting goals).
220
See id. at 13–15 (describing cap setting and allocation of allowances).
221
Cf. id. at 31–32 (explaining that CBA has sometimes been used to influence cap
setting decisions but not to produce optimal pollution levels).
222
See id. at 28–31 (collecting examples of both effects-based and technology-based
cap setting).
223
See id. at 31 (discussing allowable catch limits for tradable fishing quota programs).
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generally been technology-based.224 Examples include the acid rain program and the
first phases of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme.225
Trading proponents, however, sometimes write about trading as an antidote to
the problems they associate with technology-based rulemaking.226 They claim that
emissions trading frees agencies from the technically arduous task of evaluating
technologies, leaving that task to experts within individual companies complying
with a trading program’s limits.227
An analysis of the relationship between means and ends casts doubt upon this
vision. For part one’s comparison between cost-benefit-based and technology-based
goal setting reveals that they both depend on technological assessment, since cost
estimates generally require technological assessment.228 In other words, to the extent
that regulators wish to consider cost in establishing emissions trading programs, they
generally must evaluate technologies.
The goal setting analysis offered in part one suggests a way around this
problem. One could set goals for trading programs based on protection of public
health and the environment, regardless of cost. But the analysis in part one suggests
that using effects-based goal setting to establish the number of allowances
distributed would make goal setting more complicated in most cases than it would
be if we employed a technology-based approach to goal setting.
The writers most responsible for this view of trading as a cure for the supposed
disease of technology-based rulemaking (Richard Stewart and Bruce Ackerman),
however, envisioned legislative goal setting for trading.229 No formal criterion limits
the factors politicians can consider when they establish a trading program. Although
a wholly fact-free and utterly irrational political process establishing goals for a
224

See id. at 28–30 (describing various technology-based emissions trading programs).
See id. at 28–29, 32–33 (describing the use of BAT to guide the acid rain program
and the first two phases of the EU emissions trading scheme).
226
See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1335–37 (setting out an “indictment” of
BAT).
227
See id. at.1342–43 (claiming that trading transfers the technological assessment task
from “bureaucrats” to “business managers and engineers”).
228
Economists have sometimes based assessment of greenhouse gas abatement costs
for the economy as a whole on past relationships between fuel prices and carbon dioxide
emissions, rather than on technologies. See McGarity, supra note 108, at 218 (discussing
top-down macroeconomic models that assume that consumers respond efficiently to energy
price increases). These top-down estimation procedures, however, produce relatively high
estimates of abatement costs and do not reflect cost reductions available because of
technological advancement in the period since costly fuel prices produced a data set. See id.
Accordingly, most carbon cost studies these days include some bottom-up analysis—
analysis based on evaluation of technologies capable of abating carbon dioxide. Not only is
a top down methodology likely inappropriate for policy analysis aimed at informing specific
regulatory decisions, it is simply unavailable for many sectors emitting greenhouse gases and
generally not useful for other kinds of environmental problems.
229
See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1354 (proposing that Congress specify
the levels of pollution reduction to be achieved).
225
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trading program could sidestep all the technical difficulties that afflict regulators
setting goals for pollution reduction programs, any rational process would have to
consider some information. And the teachings derived from the analysis of goal
setting would apply to the norms and factual considerations rational politicians
consider as they establish goals. Political decision making’s opacity has obscured
this point¾that politicians rationally establishing emission limits for trading
programs necessarily confront the same technical difficulties that administrators
confront in establishing emissions limits for polluters. But the legislatively enacted
acid rain program, for example, had a technology-based rationale for the overarching
goal Congress chose. EPA had previously promulgated a new source performance
standard for sulfur dioxide through technology-based rulemaking under section 111
of the CAA.230 This number became the basis, if not the sole determinant, of the goal
that Congress chose for the acid rain program.231 Had the analysis not already been
done, legislators might well have to ask experts for fresh evaluations of
technological options and costs.
None of this denies that a legislative process involves compromise and might
include political considerations other than the normative considerations identified
here. For example, even though the acid rain program’s core goal comes rather
directly from a technology-based rulemaking, legislators adjusted the allocation of
allowances in various ways to accommodate specific particular electric utilities.232
But unless the process is wholly irrational, something like the normative structure
and the analytical questions it raises will play some role in the process.
Furthermore, administrative agencies often establish trading programs. 233
When they do, they do so under law that embodies the goals canvassed in part one.
The recognition that emissions trading must inevitably be paired with goal
setting and a clear-eyed view of the difficulties extant goal setting mechanisms
create for regulators should lead to further research on emissions trading’s political
economy. Such research will likely prove vital to addressing the greatest
230

See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,875,
24,879 (Dec. 23, 1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.43(b)).
231
See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME: RIGHTS, RENTS, AND FAIRNESS 339, 353 (A. Denny Ellerman et al. eds.,
2007) (describing the 1.2 lbs./mBTU limit as based on “the best available control
technology”); Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 400–01 (2009) (noting that the
“basic formula” underlying the goal for phase two allowances represented the multiplication
of this emissions rate by the baseline emissions for electric utilities).
232
Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmallensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 55–56 (1998)
(discussing individual variations from the basic rule for setting allowances and the
motivations for them).
233
See, e.g., North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir.), on reh’g in part,
550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing EPA’s creation of a trading program to address
interstate air pollution).
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environmental challenge we face, global climate disruption, because of
governments’ heavy reliance on emissions trading to address this problem.
Emissions trading programs, including trading programs addressing climate
disruption, have often suffered from insufficiently ambitious underlying emission
limitations.234 Some of this laxness arises from regulators succumbing to polluters’
insistence that the limits not demand anything more than reasonably available
technologies can achieve.235 Economists reviewing the European Union’s emissions
trading scheme have found this consideration of technological capabilities surprising
and suggest that this reflects a failure to fully embrace the philosophy of emissions
trading.236 But the literature on emissions trading has very little to say about how the
flexibility trading offers should influence goal setting, instead treating ambitious
goal setting as likely under trading simply because trading lowers cost.237
The question of what sort of shift in goal setting and the philosophy underlying
it would make sense and appropriately take advantage of trading’s capacity to lower
costs requires much greater attention. Can we project trading’s cost savings
sufficiently well a priori to take the savings into account when we consider what
goals are appropriate? Should trading justify a philosophical approach similar to that
underlying technology-forcing? That is, in light of trading’s capacity to make
compliance much cheaper than anticipated, should we simply have faith and put less
emphasis on formal cost estimation? Should we get cost considerations wholly off
the table in some cases based on alignment of trading with political commitments
made in international negotiations or simply a philosophy of protecting public
health? The failure to understand that trading is only a means toward some larger
end and does not automatically avoid the philosophical and technical problems we
confront in establishing goals for environmental law has distracted us from even
seeing, much less addressing, these vital questions.
C. Goal Setting and Pollution Taxes
Most economists envision pollution taxes based on the concept of optimal
pollution.238 A regulator setting an optimal pollution tax would estimate the dollar
234

See Cento Veljanovski, Economic Approaches to Regulation, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 183, at 17, 31 (characterizing the over allocation of allowances in
the EU’s emissions trading scheme in phase one as producing “no expected reduction” of
emissions).
235
See Tschochohei & Zöckler, supra note 24, at 31 (describing the cap setting under
the EU’s emissions trading scheme as driven by special interests and using a “commandand-control approach”).
236
See id. at 32 (suggesting that emissions trading should have changed the “pattern of
thought” in some unspecified way from that of “command-and-control”).
237
Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1351–59 (coupling trading with a
proposal for legislative establishment of quantitative pollution reduction mandates).
238
See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for
the Protection of the Environment, 73 SWED. J. ECON. 42, 43–44 (1971) (describing the
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value of the harms the taxed pollution generates and establish a tax rate at that
level.239 By doing so the regulator encourages polluters to equalize costs and benefits
at the margin, producing an optimal level of pollution.
The economists Baumol and Oates, however, have assumed in some of their
work that policy makers enacting a pollution tax might calibrate it to achieve a
quantitative pollution target.240 Since a tax does not specify a target, but rather leads
polluters to adopt whatever technological improvements might save them money at
a given tax rate, they envision an iterative process in which economists estimated a
tax’s effect on pollution and then policy makers adjust the tax rate iteratively until
the polluters make the desired reductions.241
The analysis above, however, shows that a rational politically chosen goal to
guide selection of a tax rate will have something in common with the feasibility
principle, protecting public health and the environment, or cost-benefit balancing
and all of the analytical difficulties those considerations imply. This implies that
choosing a tax rate implicates the philosophical and analytical questions that arise
in establishing standards regulating pollution.
This similarity may seem odd to those accustomed to thinking of a tax within
an optimality framework, but the first pollution tax proposed in the United States
was technology-based. 242 That is, legislators proposed a tax rate based on the
estimated cost of available control technology. Such a tax rate would presumably
encourage the adoption of the available technology. Indeed, rational regulators
cannot avoid the issues described in this Article’s goal setting section if they plan to
rely on a tax as a principle strategy to address an environmental problem. A tax rate
set at a price exceeding the cost of available pollution control technologies might be
needed to achieve a health-based goal and might have the consequence of either
forcing technological innovation or closing facilities. Conversely, setting a tax rate
below the cost of any available pollution control method would produce revenue but
might not reduce pollution.243 Rational regulators, even if they are elected political
officials, will likely consider the technical and normative questions that the goal
setting analysis raises, at least implicitly, in establishing a tax rate.
“proper level” of a “Pigouvian tax” as equal to the marginal damages caused by the targeted
pollutant and describing economists as reluctant “to give up the Pigouvian solution”).
239
Id. at 43.
240
See id. at 44–45 (positing using taxes to obtain “somewhat arbitrary standards” for
an acceptable environment).
241
See id. at 45 (describing the iterative process).
242
See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 19, at 745 n.88.
243
Faced with a pollution tax, polluters will pass the price increase on to consumers if
they can. But if doing so will likely cause too great a consumption decline, they may simply
absorb the tax. Conversely, if producers pass the tax on to consumers with the expectation
that consumers will not greatly reduce consumption in response, then the tax may decrease
consumers’ wealth without significant reduction in consumption of the product producing
the targeted pollution. Only if the price increase is passed on to consumers and produces a
decline in consumption of the taxed producers’ products will production and hence pollution
decline in the taxed industry.
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To be sure, a regulator wholly dedicated to allocative efficiency could set the
tax rate equal to the social cost of pollution. This would represent a normative shift
in positive law, which has almost never embraced allocative efficiency as a goal. It
would also change the form of analysis found in the positive law, but not in a way
that simplifies analysis. To establish the social cost of pollution, the regulator would
have to engage in quantitative risk assessment and monetization, the most difficult
steps involved in CBA. The regulator could, however, avoid analyzing technology
and its cost. In short, only taxation provides a means of shifting the analytical
predicate for standard goal setting, but, alas, it does so in a way that does not shed
the key analytical complexities that have beset CBA.
D. Privatizing Technological Choice, Setting Goals, and Risk/Risk Problems
This discussion of technological evaluation’s centrality when regulators
consider cost in establishing a program’s goals brings us to a related question about
the framework developed in this Article. Does this framework aid us in confronting
risk/risk dilemmas that several prominent commentators have emphasized?244 The
risk/risk dilemma usually arises because technological changes adopted to address
one environmental problem can create another. Thus, for example, United States
electric utilities have helped lower carbon emissions from power plants in recent
years by switching from coal to natural gas, which has become very cheap because
of the development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking)—obtaining natural gas
through horizontal drilling aided by the use of fluids to fracture underground rock
formations.245 Yet, fracking poses risks to water quality, usually increases emissions
of a very potent greenhouse gas¾methane, and can cause earthquakes. 246
244

See generally John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1, 1–2 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (explaining
that “efforts to combat a ‘target risk’” can increase other risks); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL
TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK vii (1992) (noting the
inevitability of tradeoffs); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1533, 1535 (1996).
245
See Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
971, 972–74 (2013) (explaining fracking and discussing the significance of the price declines
it has caused).
246
See Walter H. Boone & Mandie B. Robinson, “Whole Lotta Shakin’ Going on”:
Recent Studies Link Fracking and Earthquakes, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 68, 69 (2015) (discussing
“[t]he documented and undisputed rise in the number of earthquakes in close proximity
to . . . fracking operations”); William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing
Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government
and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 42–3 (2012) (discussing risks to
water and methane emissions); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Flowback: Federal Regulation of
Wastewater from Hydraulic Fracturing, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 265–68 (2014)
(describing the generation of waste water from fracking and the hazards associated with it).
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Accordingly, EPA’s regulations reducing power plant carbon dioxide emissions, for
example, might increase these ancillary risks if utilities respond by using more
natural gas. The framework developed above helps provide an even-handed analysis
of risk/risk issues and reveals dilemmas not widely appreciated in the risk/risk
literature.
One might think that risk/risk issues provide a reason to increase CBA’s use.
If CBA comprehensively addresses all costs and benefits, it would address risk/risk
issues.
The framework provided, and for that matter, simply the idea of taking positive
law seriously in evaluating regulatory reforms, suggests that one should at least ask
whether other goal setting provisions and, for that matter, the selection of means of
environmental protection, might account for, or cause neglect of, risk/risk
considerations.
It turns out that the environmental statutes require the consideration of ancillary
risks in promulgating both effects-based and technology-based standards in various
ways.247 It also turns out that CBA sometimes does not address ancillary risks. The
existing and modified power plant rulemaking’s CBA, for example, did not consider
ancillary risks from fracking as a cost.248 Taking the positive law into account would
greatly change the debate on how to address risk/risk problems. One might ask, for
example, whether an analytical approach that seeks to quantify and monetize
everything offers the best method of evaluating risk/risk issues in light of
uncertainties and questions about the appropriate scope of analysis.
Furthermore, the positive law suggests something implicit in this presentation
of risk/risk problems—that they often depend on the selection of technologies.
Select natural gas as a technology for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, and one
gets water quality, methane, and earthquake concerns. Select windmills, and one
gets concerns about aesthetics and birds. Thus, evaluation of risk/risk problems
requires an evaluation of the particular technologies polluters employ to meet
environmental goals.
Those urging adoption of CBA in order to address risk/risk problems, however,
in the same breath often recommend turning technological selection over to private
parties through emissions trading. 249 This privatization of technological choice
247

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A § 7408(f)(2)(C); § 7409(d)(2(C)(iv); § 7411(a)(1); §
7412(d)(2), (f)(2)(A) (West 2016).
248
EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND
RECONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS, at ES-3–ES-48 (June 2014) (defining costs in terms of
compliance costs alone). In fairness to the EPA, if it were to count the environmental costs
from fracking in the CBA, symmetry would require it to count the benefits from reduced
deaths, disease, and injuries in coal mines. And it did estimate the impact of its rule on
methane emissions from natural gas and coal, although it did not monetize these results. Id.
at 4-13–4-14, 8-3.
249
See, e,g., Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10
(1995) (recommending more use of “economic incentives” and CBA).
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should pose issues for those who argue that environmental law pays insufficient
attention to risk/risk dilemmas. After all, the selection of technologies to actually
use, rather than the establishment of emission limits underlying a trading program,
directly causes most risk/risk problems. The risk/risk issue from this perspective
presents a dilemma. Allowing private control over technological choices maximizes
cost effectiveness and engages firms’ expert knowledge. At the same time, private
control over technological choice negates the public evaluation of the seriousness of
risk/risk problems that CBA proponents advocate.250
To sum up, understanding the array of means and ends found in environmental
law and juxtaposing them significantly increases our understanding of
environmental law and the issues it raises. It suggests that more combinations of
means and ends exist than commonly thought. It undercuts stereotypical thinking
about both the nature of “command-and-control” regulation and economic
incentives, showing that the former is more variegated, complex, and sometimes
necessary than we thought, and that the latter, whatever their advantages as means
of environmental protection do not automatically solve or even finesse questions
about goals. Furthermore, private technological flexibility, while desirable in a
number of respects, poses some risk/risk issues. These insights open up a variety of
questions important to environmental law in general and to climate disruption law
in particular.
IV. FURTHER STEPS TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY
The material above demonstrates that a clear account of the means and ends of
environmental law yields important insights and research questions. Yet, a positive
theory of environmental law must go beyond means and ends to reach some other
matters. This part aims to encourage future work filling out the positive theory of
environmental law by identifying two elements that such a theory should include—
namely accounts of environmental federalism and enforcement. It then preliminarily
explores a question that those contributing to a positive theory of environmental law
should address—whether such a theory has anything to say about environmental
justice.
A. Environmental Federalism
Most federalism scholarship focuses on constitutional law, which can be
relevant to environmental law. So, for example, courts have addressed the
constitutionality of environmental statutes under the Commerce Clause.251 A whole
250

See David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173
(2006) (leaving the choice of technologies to regulated parties leaves the government with
no timely means of evaluating risk/risk tradeoffs).
251
See e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 268,
281 (1981) (upholding a statute protecting the environment from coal mining’s adverse
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line of cases under the dormant Commerce Clause (judicial limits on state authority
derived from the Constitution’s affirmative grant of Commerce Clause authority to
Congress) has addressed municipal regulation of solid waste.252 And the leading case
on the anticommandeering principle now associated with the Tenth Amendment
resolved a dispute regarding federal mechanisms to secure state cooperation in
addressing radioactive waste disposal issues.253 An enormous amount of scholarship
focuses on understanding the doctrines underlying these environmental cases.254
More importantly for environmental law’s core commitments, environmental
statutes embody a host of political decisions about when to exercise federal authority
and when to leave policy or enforcement in state hands. Richard Revesz and Kirsten
Engel have addressed a core rationale for the move made in the 1970s to give
substantial authority over environmental policy to the federal government—the fear
of a “race to the bottom” where states lowered environmental standards to attract
business.255 This is a key rationale for an important feature of environmental law.
And this scholarship addresses another important rationale for a substantial federal
role—the need for federal help in solving contentious problems of interstate
pollution not within the control of any one state.256
But this scholarship says little about the particular arrangement of authorities
found in environmental statutes, which often leaves substantial authority with state

effects); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 327–29 (1981) (upholding specific environmental
restrictions on mining).
252
See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217,
224–35 (1996) (discussing three Supreme Court environmental dormant Commerce Clause
cases decided in the 1993 term).
253
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating two
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because
the Constitution does not permit the federal government to compel states to provide for
disposal of waste generated with their borders).
254
See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004–
007 (1995) (discussing the anti–commandeering principle established in the radioactive
waste siting case); Heinzerling, supra note 252, at 224–31, 242–46 (discussing the dormant
Commerce Clause cases based on solid waste); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 209 (1998) (discussing the
application of Commerce Clause limitations to the ESA).
255
See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and
Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–80 (1997) (supporting the race-to-thebottom rationale); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1211 (1992) (disputing the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation of the
environment).
256
See, e.g., Engel, supra note 255, at 371–74 (generally endorsing rather than
critiquing the existing system); Revesz, supra note 255, at 1222 (arguing that interstate
externalities justify federal regulation).
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governments.257 William Buzbee has addressed a key aspect of that arrangement of
authority, a pattern of preempting state standards less strict than the federal standards
while usually allowing states to regulate more strictly than the federal government
does.258
The environmental statues, however, often not only allow for stand-alone state
law addressing pollution, they often envision a substantial state role in implementing
federal environmental law.259 For example, the CAA requires EPA to establish the
NAAQS but charges states with the fundamental responsibility to come up with most
of the specific pollution limits needed to meet these ambient standards. 260
Conversely, the CWA gives states the primary responsibility for formulating water
quality standards but makes basic regulation of most major dischargers (point
sources in the jargon of the Act) primarily an EPA responsibility. 261 A positive
theory of environmental federalism should note and seek to explain this discrepancy.
Furthermore, several statutes do not contemplate a substantial state policy role.262 A
positive theory might seek to explain what justifies coupling a substantial state role
for the media specific statutes with nationalization of the regulation of toxics under
FIFRA and TSCA. In any case, a positive theory should provide a description and
normative explanation of key federalism policy decisions found in environmental
law.
B. Enforcement
Clifford Rechtschaffen has ably described the normative theory underlying
environmental enforcement in Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory
257

See Engel, supra note 255, at 369–74 (not describing the arrangement of authorities
generally, but offering certain regional governance provisions in the Clean Air Act as a
model); cf. Revesz, supra note 255, at 1224–27 (describing some of the division of authority
between the federal and state governments under the Clean Air Act, but not providing a transstatutory description of the arrangement of authority).
258
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2007) (arguing that principled
rationales support a “one-way ratchet” that preempts less stringent state regulation while
preserving state authority to go beyond federal minimums).
259
See id. at 1550 (pointing out that under cooperative federalism statutes state and
local governments assume critically important regulatory duties).
260
See Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65–67 (1975).
261
See Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 801 (1980) (explaining that
Congress charged EPA with the duty to establish BAT and best practicable control
technology standards); Adler, supra note 47, at 213 (explaining that states usually
promulgate water quality standards).
262
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a) (West 2016); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
431, 437–38, (2005) (explaining that EPA, rather than the states, administers the pesticide
registration requirements and determines the appropriate labeling for pesticides); cf.
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 600 (1991) (holding that FIFRA does
not preempt local governments’ pesticide regulation).
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of Environmental Enforcement.263 He points out that the law governing enforcement
of environmental standards has traditionally relied heavily on a theory of adequate
deterrence.264 In recent decades, however, a model of cooperative enforcement has
emerged, which places more emphasis on voluntarily eliciting compliance rather
than deterring law breaking through enforcement actions.265 He also shows how in
practice agency officials usually combine elements of both philosophies. 266 He
shows how the deterrence model underlies key features of the enforcement regime,
such as substantial civil penalties, criminal penalties for deliberate noncompliance,
and the availability of citizen suits when government fails to enforce the law
adequately. 267 A positive theory of environmental enforcement along these lines
constitutes an important element of a positive theory of environmental law.
C. Environmental Justice
In recent years, a movement for environmental justice has grown up, which has
influenced environmental law and our thinking about it. Environmental justice
scholars highlight issues of distribution. 268 In particular, they allege that
communities of color suffer from disproportionate pollution burdens.269 They also
advocate close consultation with minority communities about siting industrial
facilities and other environmental decisions affecting those communities.270
A theory of positive law raises questions about how to think about
environmental justice’s relationship to environmental law. Perhaps most
fundamentally, should we think of it as a critique of the existing positive law from
the outside but obtaining some influence, more or less like law and economics? Or
does it highlight something about the positive theory of environmental law?
263

71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1191–93 (1998).
See id. at 1186 (pointing out that environmental law has traditionally been based on
a deterrence theory).
265
See id. at 1203 (describing the push toward a more cooperative model).
266
See id. at 1189 (stating that in practice enforcers combine deterrence and
cooperation).
267
See id. at 1186–89, 1230–33 (linking substantial penalties and citizen suits to the
deterrence model).
268
See Anne K. No, Environmental Justice: Concentration on Education and Public
Participation as an Alternative Solution to Legislation, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 373, 378 (1996) (equating environmental justice with the equitable sharing of pollution
burdens).
269
See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GUANA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 55–76 (2002) (reviewing disparate impact claims).
270
See No, supra note 268, at 391 (identifying expansion of public participation in
minority communities as a major advantage of President Clinton’s environmental justice
policy); Scott Kuhn, Expanding Public Participation Is Essential to Environmental Justice
and the Democratic Decisionmaking Process, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 648 (1999)
(identifying meaningful public participation as a “central tenet” of the environmental justice
movement).
264
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It bears mention that the positive law has always reflected some concerns akin
to those that environmental justice advocates highlight. The CAA, for example, has
always demanded that the NAAQS adequately protect vulnerable subpopulations.271
Environmental justice may do both; it may provide a normative challenge to some
aspects of environmental law while helping to rationalize several features of existing
law. But more work on these issues might help advance our understanding of both
environmental justice and the positive theory of environmental law.
CONCLUSION
Thus, an understanding of environmental law’s means and ends makes it
possible to understand the field as a whole, both in terms of the overall structure of
statutes and relationships between means and ends. This analysis of means and ends
yields a host of valuable insights and significant research questions. It also provides
an important foundation for evaluating proposed regulatory reforms. A reasonably
complete theory, at a minimum, should also explain key features of the enforcement
regime and the allocation of authority among governments. The theory of means and
ends articulated here constitutes a very substantial step forward in constructing a
positive theory of environmental law as a whole.
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See, e.g. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(remanding a NAAQS for particulate to EPA because EPA has not explained how its rule
will adequately protect children and other vulnerable subpopulations).

